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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND
DEMOCRATIC CRISIS IN BOLIVIA
by
Jennifer Marie Cyr
Florida International University, 2005
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor
Using Kenneth Roberts’ (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study
examined the reasons for the decline of the political party system in Bolivia after 2000,
The political party system that emerged in 1985 was connected to society primarily
through clientelist-based linkages. The economic and political model adopted after the
transition to democracy severely debilitated the party system’s capacity to forge linkages
with society beyond clientelism.
Using interviews, survey data, and primary and secondary documents, the study
demonstrated that prolonged economic recession and social change revealed the
weaknesses of the linkages connecting the political party system with Bolivian society. It
concluded that the party system in Bolivia went into decline because it could not adapt to
the country’s changing social landscape after 2000. The highly limited nature o f
clientelist-based linkages in Bolivia suggests that they were ill-suited to withstand
economic recession and social crisis.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“El establecimiento de la democracia desde 1982 ha abierto un nuevo ciclo politico en el país” (Lazarte
1991,588).
“El 17 de octubre del 2003 quiebra con la lógica de la política consecuencial... el centro hegemónico está
vacio; hemos vuelto al debate de hace veinte años” (Mayorga, F. 2004).

In 1982, Dr. Hernán Siles Zuazo was elected President o f Bolivia, officially
marking the return to democracy in a country that had experienced almost twenty years o f
dictatorship, coups d’état, and intermittent and short-lived election cycles. Upon his call
for new elections and his subsequent stepping down in 1985, a new era in Bolivian
democracy would be forged - one consisting o f successive coalition governments, or a
pacted democracy, and accompanied by a strict neoliberal economic plan, the New
Economic Policy (NPE, in Spanish).
Six coalitions and twenty-one years later, Bolivia’s political system confronted
the worst crisis of its recent democratic history. The then one year old administration,
headed by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, o f the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
(MNR), was forced to resign after months o f protests, blockades, and calls for the
dismantling of what many Bolivians would call his corrupt, exclusive, and ineffective
coalition.1 Indeed, Sánchez de Lozada was not able to implement the majority o f his
economic and social policies in that first year. His negotiations with coca growers fell
through, and plans to implement a 12.5% income tax hike and potentially sign a
hydrocarbons deal were summarily rejected both by opposition in Congress and in the
streets.

1 The Bolivian newspaper, La Razón, spells out in detail the events o f October 2003, when Sánchez de
Lozada was eventually forced to resign. See “21 Años,” : http://www.larazon.com/Especial/Qctubre/esp03101 Oc.html (October 10, 2003).
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With the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia entered into a
tumultuous period of political restructuring. The period was marked by the ascension of
Sánchez de Lozada’s partyless vice president, Carlos Mesa Gilbert, to the presidency, the
implementation of a law that expanded the right to ran for office to citizen and
indigenous groups, and the use of referenda on important policy-making issues such as
the exportation of the country’s large gas reserves and regional autonomy. These post2003 “anti-party” characteristics o f Bolivia’s political system, along with 2004 polling
results suggesting that the popularity o f the country’s traditional political parties are at
an all-time low, indicated that Bolivia’s political party system had been widely rejected
and discredited by various sectors of society. The resulting party system decline forced
the country to return, as Fernando Mayorga states above, to the political debates o f
twenty years past.
What can explain the dismantling of a political party system that had been both
functioning and stable for almost twenty years? From where does a political crisis, such
as the one experienced by Bolivia in the early twenty-first century, arise? The following
pages seek to analyze the emergence and decline of the traditional political party system
in Bolivia, identifying the primary reasons for and the subsequent legacies o f the political
crisis of 2003-2004.
The contents o f this paper have important implications for issues o f political
representation in general. The question is asked: why do political party systems fail to be
representative? Literature abounds (including O’Donnell 1996 and 1998, Huntington
2 During the era o f pacted democracy, coalition governments had been alternately run by three political
parties: the MNR, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), and the Acción Democrática
Nacionalista (ADN). Henceforth, any use o f the term “traditional political parties” or the “traditional
political party system” in Bolivia will refer to these three parties.
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1991) on the difficulties faced by newly democratizing countries to make their nascent
regimes work efficiently and effectively. This literature suggests that democratization
has been superficial at best and a practical failure at worst. The analysis below works
from the assumption that challenges to effective mediation between the state and society
have impeded the process of democratization in countries like Bolivia. Assessing those
challenges in the Bolivian case may shed some light on what might make political party
systems, and hence representative democracy, work for many countries in the years
ahead.
Using Kenneth Roberts’ (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study
examines the reasons for the decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia
before, during, and after the political crisis o f 2003. The following pages demonstrate
that the weakly institutionalized political party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) that
emerged after the transition to democracy in 1982 was sustained by clientelist-based
patrimonial party-society linkages with primarily the urban middle class. The economic
and political models adopted after the transition severely debilitated the party system’s
capacity to expand these linkages. Different sectors o f Bolivian society, including the
newly politicized urban poor and rural classes, thus began to look elsewhere for
alternative forms of representation that could accommodate their growing demands,
including with political parties founded in the 1990s and the newly formalized citizen and
indigenous groups in 2004.
The failure o f the traditional political party system to maintain its linkages, as
well as its inability to forge new linkages with Bolivian society, would be detrimental to
its long-term sustainability. These failures, together with a prolonged economic crisis
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and a longstanding tradition of corporatist-based mobilization in the country, exacerbated
tensions between the traditional political parties and the newly empowered political
forces both in Congress and in the streets. The findings o f this study suggest that the
traditional political party system in Bolivia was dependent upon middle class-based,
clientelist party-society linkages for survival. Unable to accommodate the demands of
the newly politicized urban and rural poor, the legitimacy and sustainability o f the
traditional political party system were severely undermined.
Reviewing the Literature
Political parties are essential for present-day Latin American democracies. This
widely shared and longstanding belief (Schattschneider 1942, Mainwaring and Scully
1995, Mainwaring 1999, Lipset 2000, Levitsky and Cameron 2003) has helped orient
democratic theory and scholarship in the region despite the challenges political party
systems in most of Latin America have consistently confronted since the third wave o f
democratization (Huntington 1991) began in the 1970s.
The importance o f political parties for representative democracy derives from
their role as mediators between state and society. Sartori (1976) asserts that political
parties are the institutional instrument of representation within the political system. They
are independent agents that channel the demands o f their constituents to government.
That is, parties should be instruments for “representing the people by expressing their
demands” (Sartori 1976, 27, emphasis in the original). Sartori underscores this
expressive function of political parties. He contends that parties should use their power
to wield influence in government. They should, in effect, be a “mechanism o f retaliation
and enforcement” o f the “citizens’ ‘voices’” (Sartori 1976, 58).
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Despite their implicit importance for representative democracy, political party
systems in Latin America have been studied extensively by relatively few scholars. The
literature that has been published is both thorough and illuminating with regards to
several different characteristics of party systems in Latin America. Typically, academics
use three theoretical approaches to study political party systems in the region. They
develop classification schemes for understanding parties cross-nationally; study the
institutional factors that might either weaken or strengthen party systems; and analyze the
structural factors that bring about the emergence o f parties and party systems and thus
offer insight into why those systems might decline. While this last perspective provides
the theoretical basis of the work at hand, each approach to Latin American party systems
is fundamental for understanding the complex and dynamic lifeblood that has made
representative democracies “workable” in the region (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 3),
The works of Sartori (1976), Downs (1957), Coppedge (1997), and Alcántara and
Friedenberg (2001) utilize the first theoretical approach for examining political party
systems. Specifically, they devise several different formulas for evaluating party system
formation and identifying the parties that make up each system. Sartori’s denotes two
dimensions for classifying party systems. He uses the number o f parties in a system and
the ideological difference among parties to categorize party systems into seven different
classes (Sartori 1976, 125). Downs approaches systems from the spatial dimension and
argues that systems tend to fall along a continuum in which parties fulfill the ideological
demands o f a society as determined by voters’ preferences.
Works such as these have provided the theoretical foundations for later
assessments of party systems. In the case o f Sartori and Downs, however, their texts
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have been used primarily to understand the party systems o f advanced industrial countries
(Mainwaring 1999, 23). Thus, their applicability to the characteristics o f political parties
in newly democratizing countries such as those found in Latin America is limited.
Michael Coppedge (1997) produced a working paper with the particular purpose o f
classifying the major political parties from eleven different countries in Latin America.
He collaborated with a series of specialists to characterize each country’s parties along
the left/right axis, the secular/Christian divide, or as being personalist, environmental,
regional, ethnic, or feminist (Coppedge 1997, 2). Similarly, Alcántara and Friedenberg
identify two internal and three external characteristics o f the political parties in eighteen
different Latin American countries, in an effort to view a party not just as one part o f a
system’s “pluralistic whole” (Sartori 1976, 26) but also as an entity in itself with its own
unique interests. The goal of all four of these classification systems is to allow for cross
national comparisons of political parties and party systems. Yet, in each case
characterization is inevitably static, denying each party system any dynamism - a trait
that is particularly important to consider in the context o f democratization.
Linz (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Mainwaring (1999) argue that
institutional factors best explain the nuances o f a country’s party system. They utilize the
second theoretical approach for understanding Latin American political party systems.
For Linz, the great debate centers on the merits of parliamentary versus presidential or
semi-presidential systems. Presidentialism within the context o f a weak multiparty
system, he argues, feeds upon and exacerbates the weaknesses o f parties by forcing the
executive to bypass partisan entities in order to enact policy through individualist and
often clientelistic means (Linz 1994, 35). Linz’s bias towards parliamentarism may help
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in illuminating the weaknesses of presidential systems and, in the case o f Bolivia, of
hybrid presidential systems (Gamarra 1997). Having identified the debilities o f these
systems, however, Linz’s work cannot explain why a weakly institutionalized hybrid
presidential system like Bolivia’s would last as long as it did; consequently, it cannot
help explain which variables would eventually lead to that system’s decline.
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) use the institutional approach to differentiate party
systems along an inchoate-institutionalized continuum, identifying four measures for
evaluating to what extent a political party system is institutionalized. They argue, as does
Mainwaring (1999), that greater institutionalization fosters a more stable and enduring
democracy in a country. The consequences o f a weakly institutionalized system, on the
other hand, can profoundly affect a country’s “democratic survival,” since these systems
are equated with a higher degree o f personalism and uncertainty and weaker mechanisms
o f accountability (Mainwaring 1999, 38). Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995),
Mainwaring’s 1999 work hints at some of the possible implications o f a weakly
institutionalized system, not just for governance and representation, but for the survival
o f the regime in general. Ultimately, however, their classification scheme for party
systems, as with Coppedge (1998) and Alcántara and Friedenberg (2001), is inherently
limited in terms of understanding the dynamic nature o f the post-transition party systems
in countries like Bolivia. Thus, it is not able to expound upon the factors that bring about
either the strengthening or, as in the case o f interest here, the decline o f political party
systems.
The third theoretical approach to party systems is a structural one, and it comes
closest to understanding the underlying forces that cause the emergence, and hence also

7

the potential decline or decay, of a political party system. Specifically, structuralists
identify the existing social, economic, and political conditions that shape the nature and
characteristics of an emerging party system. They provide an historical context for
understanding why a party system is the way it is and in this way help illuminate the
cracks and “fault lines” (Agüero and Stark 1998) in the system that could also bring
about its decline.
For example, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) offer a look at the emergence o f party
systems in Western Europe. They argue that party systems arise out o f alternative
alliances and oppositions during the period o f nation-building. The process o f nationbuilding, they argue, is shaped by a two-dimensional space in which the political
expressions of territorial-cultural and functional conflicts - also called cleavages - fall.
How these conflicts emerge and how they are subsequently addressed will determine in
large part the nature and alignment of political parties within a country (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967, 5-7).
Collier and Collier’s (1991) study on labor relations is another example. They
look at the different policies adopted by eight Latin American countries in response to
their growing labor movements. They argue that the decision to implement different
labor policies led to the formation of different institutions that shaped the character of
labor-state relations for years to come. The distinct institutional design chosen in each
case sparked a process o f political evolution that would ultimately determine the nature
of each governmental regime and how it subsequently interacted with society (Collier and
Collier 1991, 37). The analyses o f Lipset and Rokkan and o f Collier and Collier offer
important insight on the emergence o f party systems in specific countries at specific
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times. That said, their approach is inherently limited to past historical periods: for Lipset
and Rokkan, the era of the reformation and the French and Industrial Revolutions, and for
Collier and Collier, the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement in their country set
(Collier and Collier 1991, 22). As such, they cannot serve as a framework for addressing
the emergence o f party systems in general, including, for the purposes o f this study, the
Bolivian political party system that was established in the 1980s.
Coppedge (1998) argues that party systems in Latin America are either
“established” or “chaotic” depending upon the nature of the political order prior to the
expansion of political participation to the lower and middle classes and the time-frame in
which such participation was granted (Coppedge 1998, 199). The impact o f these two
conditions influences party system development in terms o f the cleavages that divide the
parties, the legitimacy of the opposition, and the degree to which the parties are
institutionalized. His work helps us to understand why certain party systems emerge in
different Latin American countries, but it is less helpful in understanding the subsequent
life cycle o f each system, as well as its possible decline.
Kenneth Roberts5 work (2002) on Latin American political party systems
overcomes the geographical and historical limitations of the aforementioned studies,
putting forth a framework that allows us to understand party system decline at any point
during a party system’s life cycle. Thus, his work applies to the Bolivian traditional
political party system of the late 20th century. The scholar analyzes extant political party
systems and the particular ways in which those systems interact with society. Viewing
political parties as “vital intermediaries” between state and society (Roberts 2002, 13), he
argues that there are five different party-society linkages that connect political parties to

9

their constituents. Political brokerage and patron-client linkages are based on the
exchange of material benefits for political support. Encapsulating linkages, also known
as corporatist or participatory linkages, forge powerful bonds between politicians and
their constituents, who are generally organized into social blocs. Ideological and
programmatic commitments form the basis o f programmatic linkages, whereas
personalistic linkages are characterized by the charismatic bond that forms between a
party leader and voters. Finally, marketing linkages are based upon contingent and
temporary connections that are formed primarily at electoral junctures and then quickly
dissolve.
Importantly, these party-society linkages evolve. They are established when
political parties can ally themselves with the social and economic cleavages in a given
society at a given time. They decline or decay3 when the political party system does not
adapt as the social and economic cleavages shift. Thus, Roberts develops a causal
relationship between social and economic change and the effectiveness o f a political
party system. A political party system can avoid crises if it is able to adapt to and evolve
with the changing nature of society. This proposition holds true at any point during a
party system’s life cycle, giving the approach dynamism and long-term applicability.
That is, it allows us to evaluate the status o f a party system’s linkages with society at any

3 Roberts is not explicit about the meanings o f party system decline and party system decay in his work
(Roberts 2002, 2003) on party-society linkages. However, it is clear from the context in which he employs
both terms that party system decline is used when a party system is dealigning from the linkages that
formerly connected that system with society. Party system decay happens when the political parties have
completely dealigned with society and, in the absence o f the formation o f new party-society linkages, have
been unable to realign with that society and are dismantled completely. Venezuala’s party system is an
example o f party system decay, since the emergence o f Hugo Chávez, as a populist non-party system
leader, replaced the former system entirely. Party system decline, however, suggests that the process o f
dealignment o f the political party system is still incomplete. Thus, party system realignment or total decay
are both still very real possibilities.
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given period and, unlike Coppedge’s theory above, is not limited to understanding only
party system emergence.
Roberts (2002) is not alone in his theory about linkages. Conaghan (1996)
specifically addresses the Andean region - Bolivia included - when she asserts that the
problematic nature of democracy in the Andes is due to “faulty political linkages”
(Conaghan 1996, 34). Moreover, Roberts (2003) further elaborates this idea o f failing
linkages in his analysis of the decline and eventual decay o f the Venezuelan political
party system in the 1990s. He contends that prolonged economic crisis and social change
in Venezuela led to the erosion o f the encapsulating and clientelist linkages that had been
the primary mediating channels between state and society throughout the period o f import
substitution industrialization (ÍSI). In particular, the shift from a state-oriented economic
policy to one based on neoliberal principles undermined corporatist relationships and thus
aggravated the clientelist demands upon the much-reduced state. Unable to
accommodate these demands, the strong linkages between state and society eroded,
eventually causing the party system’s demise. The erosion o f these linkages enabled the
emergence of the unmediated (that is, essentially partyless) populist leadership o f Hugo
Chávez Frias.
Thus, the idea of linkages is important for understanding the state o f alignment,
dealignment, in the case where parties detach from their social moorings, or subsequent
realignment o f political parties vis-a-vis society. When these linkages have eroded, the
mediating capacity o f political parties is debilitated or severed, undermining the
popularity and credibility o f these representative institutions and making the creation o f
new linkages between parties and society increasingly difficult. Thus, the sustainability
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or decline o f a party system is dependent upon its ability to maintain societal linkages
within a changing economic, political, and/or social context.
In the case o f Venezuela, Roberts argues that the political party system failed to
preserve its corporatist and clientelist linkages with Venezuelan society. The subsequent
party system decline led to a surge in populism, dismantling the formerly institutionalized
two-party system altogether. The analysis to follow will employ Roberts’ theory of
party-society linkages to evaluate the state o f Bolivia’s traditional political parties in the
early 21st century, more then fifteen years after its party system was consolidated within
the country’s newly established democratic regime. The emergence and subsequent crisis
o f Bolivia’s political party system serves as an opportunity for building an understanding
o f what conditions might lead to party system decline. This is important because, as
Roberts acknowledges, literature on party decline and decay is scarce (Roberts 2003, 40).
The Bolivian Traditional Political Party system as a Case Study
Bolivia serves as an interesting case for testing Roberts’ argument that prolonged
social and economic change can lead to the erosion o f party-society linkages and thus
party system decline. The country is unique from Roberts’ Venezuelan case study
because, up until the transition to democracy in 1982, the corporatist and clientelist
linkages between political parties and society were extremely tenuous in the country.
Thus, the traditional political party system that was established in 1985 initially had very
weak linkages with the Bolivian populace. Instead o f strengthening these linkages,
however, the political and economic model adopted at that time exacerbated their
inherent weaknesses.
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In particular, the austerity measures embodied in the NPE reduced the size o f the
state and privatized the industries that provided the material and organizational resources
needed to maintain corporatist linkages. The principle o f pacted democracy diminished
the role of the traditional political party system, preventing those parties from
establishing new linkages with society beyond clientelist-based patrimonialism. When
the country faced prolonged economic recession and social change after 2000, the party
system was unable to maintain its clientelist linkages with society. Moreover, the
longstanding political influence of other non-state actors, as well as the emergence o f
new political parties and social movements, served as attractive alternatives to traditional
political party-based representation. After 2000, the convergence o f these factors forced
the political party system into decline.
The study to follow makes this argument by looking first at the state-society
linkages that existed prior to the consolidation o f the traditional political party system.
After the National Revolution in 1952, the M NR’s attempt to establish an enduring
hegemonic single-party system failed. This was due in part to the party’s inability to co
opt important sectors of Bolivian society within its party network. Its failure can also be
attributed, however, to the unusual strength of the country’s Workers Central (in Spanish,
the Central Obrera Boliviana [COB]), the nationally-based confederation o f labor unions
that stridently maintained its autonomy from the M NR’s grasp upon its creation in the
aftermath o f the 1952 Revolution.
When a coup d’état placed the military in charge after twelve years o f
increasingly debilitated MNR leadership, the influence o f political parties in the Bolivian
state disappeared almost entirely. Between 1964 and 1978, the straggle for control of the
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country took place primarily between two other potent actors: the COB and the military.
While the 1970s brought about the foundation of the other two political parties that would
eventually form the “tripod” (Mayorga, R., 2002) o f the country’s traditional political
party system,4 politics during this time was marked by either close alliances or sharp
conflicts between the military and the unions (Lazarte 1991, 584). Thus, prior to the
transition to representative democracy in 1982, the role o f political parties as
intermediaries between state and society was matched and at times undermined by both
the COB and the military.
When the country restored the democratically elected president, Hernán Siles
Zuazo, and his leftist coalition, Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP), to power in 1982,
the principle of party-led government would be reinitiated for the first time in thirty
years. As a part of his broad-based coalition, Siles Zuazo initially incorporated the COB
and the rural sectors into government, using the post-Revolution corporatist logic o f cogovernment to coopt and integrate these influential constituencies into the state. Faced
with one of the worst economic crises in the country’s history, an opposition-led
Congress, and the eventual failure o f co-government with labor and the campesinos,
however, Siles Zuazo was unable to maintain control o f the country and was forced to
call for early elections in 1985.
Many scholars (Lazarte 1991, Klein 1992, Mayorga, R. 1997, Calderón and
Gamarra 2003, Mayorga, F. 2004, Gamarra 2003b) have recognized the importance o f
the first year o f the administration of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR, 1985-1989) in the
forging o f a new political and economic stabilization program for the country.

4 The M IR was founded in 1971, the ADN in 1979.
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Specifically, Paz Estenssoro and his team of technocrats established a precedent for
congressionally supported coalition rule - called democracia pactada, or pacted
democracy - while simultaneously implementing a “draconian austerity program,”
known as the NPE, designed to put an end to the long-standing and severe economic
crisis in the country (Gamarra 2003b, 298), In essence, in 1985, a distinct form of
representative rule was established alongside a distinct model for economic reform.
Taken together, the 1985 reforms fashioned an unprecedented system for
centralized economic and political decision-making unlike anything Bolivians had
experienced in the past - what one scholar (Mayorga, F. 2004) has called a “hegemonic
center”. Importantly, this center consisted o f the dominance o f the three traditional
political parties that would alternate governance o f the country in the form o f coalitions
from 1985 until the elections of 2002. It would be buoyed on both sides by the principle
of pacted democracy and the NPE. The hegemonic center would be so strong that, as
Fernando Mayorga suggests, it would forge coalitions out o f political parties with an at
times mutual dislike for each other5 and establish agreements from these coalitions to
form public policies despite an at times strong opposition in the legislative branch
(Mayorga, F. 2004).
The analysis to follow demonstrates that the strength o f this hegemonic center of
traditional political parties was fundamental in establishing the political stability
necessary in order to make decision-making and the implementation o f reforms possible.
At the same time, this analysis suggests that the nature o f Bolivia’s hegemonic center

5 For example, the Acuerdo Patriótico (1989-93) between the leftist MIR and the conservative right-wing
ADN and the most recent coalition between the MNR and the MIR (2002-2003).
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weakened the traditional political party system’s linkages with society. The NPE
destroyed any farther capacity for the encapsulating, corporatist-based linkages that had
traditionally linked Bolivian society to the state by drastically reducing the size o f the
country’s bureaucracy and privatizing most o f the state-run industries that had served as
the material foundations of the unions and as the source o f patronage for the political
parties. Moreover, conditions of scarcity and poor economic growth limited farther the
reach o f this patronage-based clientelism, thus reducing the impact o f the traditional party
system’s primary linkage with society after 1985.
Despite the nature of the party-society linkages in Bolivia after the transition to
democracy, the traditional political party system remained in power and was even stable
until the end of the 1990s. All of this changed at the turn o f the millennium. Faced with
an acute two-year economic crisis, the resource-stricken government was trapped
between addressing intense international pressures to curb the cultivation o f coca and
equally intense but contradictory internal demands from an increasingly politicized civil
society. Here, the limitations of the clientelist-based linkages between the traditional
political parties and society became evident. Oriented historically towards Bolivia’s
urban middle class, these linkages could not sufficiently enfranchise the newly mobilized
urban and rural sectors in the country. Thus, the sectors began to look beyond the
traditional political parties for economic and social relief, turning their votes and thus
their tacit support to the newly formed political parties that emerged in the 1990s and
early 21st century.
This study suggests that since 2000, the decline o f Bolivia’s traditional political
party system became increasingly apparent. Indeed, by 2005, it appeared that the weak
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linkages that connected the traditional political parties to Bolivian society had been all
but severed. For one, the vice president-tumed-president Carlos Mesa had no formal
political party support and based his popular October Agenda6 on this fact. Furthermore,
important policy decisions were removed from the realm o f the legislature and left to the
consideration of the Bolivian population at large. The referendum on the Hydrocarbons
Law in July 2004 was an important example o f this. A third important aspect o f the post2003 political system was the institutionalization o f a Law o f Citizen and Indigenous
Groups {Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas), This law allowed
political candidates to run independently o f political parties as a part o f newly legislated
citizen or indigenous groups.
Each of these institutional changes represented a move further away from the use
o f political parties as the sole channel o f representation in the country’s democratic
regime. They also reflected the degree to which linkages between these parties and
society had eroded. As we will see in the chapters that follow, in the case o f Bolivia, the
decline o f the traditional political party system had its roots, somewhat ironically, in the
very economic and political reforms that made the party system possible in the first place.
By 2005, the outcomes of this decline, that is, whether it would detach from society
altogether or realign with society along new party-society linkages were still unclear.
Following Roberts’ party-society framework, then, the hypothesis tested in the
proceeding pages is the following;

6 Mesa took over the presidency with the promise to: organize a binding referendum on the extraction and
processing o f the country’s hydrocarbons; pass a new Hydrocarbons Law in accordance with that
referendum; and realize a Constituent Assembly {La Razón, 18 October 2003). These three promises came
to be known as his October Agenda.
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Question # 1:

Why did Bolivia’s traditional political party system enter into
decline after 2000?

Hypothesis #1:

Bolivia’s traditional political party system entered into decline,
because the weak clientelist linkages it had forged with Bolivian
society were unable to adapt to shifting societal demands in the
country after 2000.

Methodology and Analysis
Using Robert’s theory of party-society linkages in the case o f Bolivia requires
identifying the linkages that existed between political parties and society prior to the
country’s transition to democracy in the 1980s. Thus, Chapter Two is dedicated to
developing the political history of Bolivia from before the 1952 National Revolution until
the transition to democracy in the early 1980s. It concludes that political parties were not
the sole intermediary between state and society in the country’s political system during
this time. Other political actors, including the military and the COB, served as equally
powerful vehicles for representation in the country, and their linkages were based on
clientelism and corporatism.
It is also necessary to analyze the emergence and evolution o f the traditional
political party system that would eventually enter into decline in the early 21st century.
Chapter Three looks at the formulation and maturation o f this party system throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, examining the clientelist linkages forged with Bolivian society. It
analyzes the role of pacted democracy and the NPE in hindering the capacity o f the
traditional political parties to sustain their linkages with society as well as forge new
linkages. It also addresses the growing economic recession and accompanying social
changes by the end o f the 1990s. Constrained by the political and economic models
adopted in 1985, the traditional political parties were unable to accommodate the growing
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demands brought about by the economic crisis by the end o f the century. In essence,
while pacted democracy and the NPE brought both governance and stability to the
country, they also enabled the decline o f the traditional political party system.
Chapter Four examines the various manifestations o f the erosion o f party-society
linkages in Bolivia. The analysis in this chapter is achieved through a triangulation of
methods. Cross-national data from two different sets o f surveys help gauge the opinions
of Bolivian society during the period of traditional party system rale and during its
decline. Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, with the support o f the University o f Pittsburgh
and USAID, carried out nationwide surveys on the political culture o f Bolivian
democracy every two years since 1998. These data allow for a limited comparison o f the
changing views of a representative sample o f Bolivians over a time period that began
during the period of party system rule and continued through 2004. The Bolivian
National Electoral Court (CNE, in Spanish) carried out, with the support o f the Canadian
Agency for International Development, the Second National Study on Democracy and
Democratic Values in Bolivia during the second half of 2004. This nationwide effort
used surveys, in-depth interviews, and focus groups to evaluate Bolivian perceptions
toward and expectations o f democracy. Analysis of these data supports this study’s
contention that the traditional political parties in Bolivia became detached from their
social moorings after 2000.
Additionally, interviews and seminars carried out during two trips to Bolivia in
2004 and 2005 emphasize the challenges faced by the party system after the transition to
democracy in the 1980s and up until its eventual decline. Primary documents, including
constitutional amendments and enacted legislation from the 1980s to 2003, provide the
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historical context needed to support the evidence from the interviews and the
interpretation of the aforementioned surveys and focus groups. Finally, secondary
documents, including newspapers and other academic literature, serve to deepen the
analysis and understanding of the events that took place throughout the period of
Bolivian political history examined here. Altogether, the evidence demonstrates that the
linkages connecting the traditional political party system with Bolivian society were
unable to endure the economic and social changes after 2000.
One possible limitation of the paper is its external validity. While general trends
in party-society linkages can and have been identified cross-nationally over time (Roberts
2002, 2003), the nature and evolution of the party-society linkages in the Bolivian case
are inevitably case-specific. However, the impact o f economic reforms on other weakly
institutionalized political party systems, such as, for example, Ecuador or Peru, may
prove to be similar to the Bolivian case. Thus, the evolution and decline of the party
system in Bolivia can serve as a basis o f comparison for understanding the emergence
and decline of other political party systems in the region. This analysis makes the case,
then, for future comparative work with other decayed or declining party systems in Latin
America or beyond.
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II.

HISTORICAL TRENDS IN BOLIVIAN POLITICS
Understanding why certain linkages between political parties and society do or do

not exist today is only possible by evaluating the historical context out o f which those
linkages arose. The three traditional political parties in Bolivia’s party system, the MNR,
the MIR, and the ADN, emerged prior to the return to democracy in 1982. They each
were founded for different reasons and during unique periods o f the country’s political
history. The goal of this chapter is to examine those periods prior to Bolivia’s transition
to democracy and highlight the important characteristics o f its political system during that
time. The linkages between state and society forged then had a profound impact on the
weak mediating capacities of the post-transition political party system.
As mentioned in Chapter One, Kenneth Roberts (2002) identifies five different
types of linkages that have historically connected society to political parties in Latin
th

America. He contends that, throughout the 20 century and particularly during the
periods o f economic growth based on import substitution industrialization (ISI), the
bonds that existed in the region were primarily o f a corporatist and clientelist nature
(Roberts 2003, 44). Bolivia fits this generalization. Where they were present, the
linkages between the country’s political parties and society between the 1950s and 1980s
tended to be either clientelist or corporatist in character.
Chapter Two, then, develops the history o f state-society linkages throughout
Bolivian contemporary history. It is organized into four sections that address each o f the
important pre-democratic transition periods in recent Bolivian history. As the pages to
follow demonstrate, the role o f intermediary between state and society varied during each
period. Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, the Bolivian political system consisted o f
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two parties that alternated power within a severely limited democratic regime. The
linkages that existed reflected the Liberal and Conservative cleavages typical in Latin
America at that time (Coppedge 1998). After 1952, a single hegemonic party, the MNR,
dominated the country, forging linkages to society that were corporatist and clientelistbased. A succession of military regimes controlled the country after 1964; here, too
linkages were primarily clientelist and corporatist in nature. The period o f the tortuous
transition to democracy beginning after 1978 marked a time when the state-society
linkages were few but political actors who wanted power were many.
The chapter concludes that, while the traditional political parties emerged before
the transition to democracy, their role as an intermediary between state and society was
matched by that o f both the military and the COB in terms o f governance and
representation. Thus, the linkages they forged with society were at best very tenuous. It
is important to examine each of these periods, and the traditional political parties’ role in
Bolivia’s political system during this time, because both were influential in determining
the party-society linkages that emerged after 1985.
Clientelism and Corporatism
Before entering into the historical analysis, it is necessary to first clarify the
study’s usage of corporatism and clientelism. As some authors acknowledge (Collier and
Collier 1979), concepts like these tend to be used broadly to describe a range o f different
political behaviors. To avoid such confusion, each term is first defined here. Further
reference to both clientelism and corporatism should be interpreted with each definition
in mind. Corporatist bonds are constructed as vertically segmented relationships between
a bureaucratic center (i.e. the state) and a network o f legally recognized guilds and/or
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corporations (for example, organized labor, campesino organizations, and the private
sector). These organized sectors of society encapsulate individual interests collectively;
in turn, the state addresses the demands and interests o f the sectors (Kaufman 1977, 111).
The logic o f representation behind corporatism contrasts with that which underlies
a modern-day polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 1998) or representative democracy. Whereas
representative democracies utilize political parties as the primary channels o f mediation
between state and society, in a corporatist system, these channels are practically
eliminated in exchange for direct interaction between the state and sectorally-segmented
society. As the Bolivian case demonstrates, the role o f historically strong labor unions in
the country has perpetuated conflicts between the state and society since the 1952
National Revolution. The struggle to determine who has the monopoly o f representation
within the Bolivian political system is one that has been ongoing since that time.
Clientelism consists o f a particularistic exchange relationship between two actors
o f unequal power or status (Kaufman 1977, 113). Here, too, a vertical relationship exists
between state and society. In this instance, however, the link between these actors is one
based on the reciprocal exchange of goods and services. Clientelist-based linkages are
inherently contingent upon these exchanges. Where resources are scarce, the fleeting and
temporary character o f the relationship is exacerbated. At the same time, resource
scarcity foments clientelist behaviors. The capacity to mount social assistance or service
provision programs are weakened and thus appeals for votes occur on a more individual
level. As a result, incentives to collectively organize around programmatic appeals are
virtually non-existent (Valenzuela 1977, 167). The paradox between scarcity and
clientelism underscores the tenuous nature o f linkages based on this type o f behavior.
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Clientelism thrives in an environment of scarcity but at the same time is severely limited
in scope because of that scarcity and, accordingly, is vulnerable to change.
In the Bolivian case, clientelistic dynamics dominated the political system after
the transition to democracy. Specifically, the state functioned almost exclusively through
neopatrimonialism, or the logic of appropriating public office for private means.
Dependent upon support networks to maintain rale, Bolivian leaders have continually
drawn from state coffers in order to sustain and expand that support. As a result, the state
becomes little more than a “personal resource to maintain [the neopatrimonial leader’s]
rule” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110). The weaknesses o f these clientelist-based
neopatrimonial linkages between the traditional political party system and society became
apparent by the end o f the 1990s, as subsequent chapters demonstrate. Like corporatism,
however, these linkages connected the society to the state throughout the 20th century well before the traditional political party system was established in 1985.
The analysis that follows looks at the evolution o f the clientelist and corporatistbased linkages between state and society during Bolivia’s contemporary political history.
By understanding how these linkages materialized prior to the adoption o f representative
democracy, it is possible to evaluate their impact on the role o f the traditional political
party system after 1985. Specifically, the role o f the military and the COB was on par
with and at times more influential than that o f the traditional political parties prior to the
democratic transition. Thus, the parties had to compete with each o f these actors as
intermediaries between the Bolivian state and the population. As a result, the traditional
political party system maintained tenuous linkages with society heading into the period o f
representative democracy.
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The Pre-Revolutionary Period: Bolivia prior to 1952
Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, Bolivia’s political system was largely
restricted to and controlled by a small set of political elites who were unified by similar
economic interests. In particular, between 1884 and 1899, leadership o f the country
alternated between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and no more than ten percent of
the adult male population was able to vote (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 400), At this
time, too, the economic importance of Bolivia’s tin industry was growing to its height,
and most of the political activity was focused on the powerful tin barons, also known as
la rosea, or three tin-exporting families who controlled most o f the country’s economic
and thus political resources.
With the arrival of the twentieth century, the influence o f the Conservative Party
had largely dwindled, since most of its base consisted of the then declining silver
oligarchy. Caudillo-based Liberal factions took over the struggle for power, and
government became little more than “a commodity, a prize in the struggle between
factions made up of the leaders drawn from the elite” (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 401).
Politics at the time, then, was for a very select group of elites. The peasant groups, poor
urban class sectors, and the growing middle class were largely excluded from
participating in the limited two-party democracy.
All of this changed with Bolivia’s defeat in the Chaco War (1932-1935). Called a
“humiliating military disaster,” the results o f this war helped bring about the demise of
the early twentieth century political elites (Malloy 1970, 322). At the time, the effects o f
the 1929 worldwide depression were being felt and Bolivia’s tin industry was
experiencing an unprecedented decline. This decline restricted the political elite’s ability
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to control the new labor groups that had emerged during the peak years o f tin extraction
and exportation. In the 1930s, then, the convergence o f economic crisis, tin industry
decline, and Bolivia’s tragic military loss served as important factors in rendering the
Liberal party politicians, and la rosea in general, ineffective in controlling Bolivia’s
increasingly mobilized and underrepresented society.
In the Liberal Party’s wake, new parties emerged that corresponded with the
demands of the newly politicized sectors o f Bolivian society. On the left, the Partido de
la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR, 1940) was founded, as well as the trotskyist Partido
Obrero Revolucionario (POR, 1944), which became the primary party for the labor
groups. The leftover oligarchy and other Bolivian elites found their political expression
in the right-wing Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB, 1937). These parties fulfilled the
class-based cleavages that emerged in the context o f economic decline in the 1930s.
However, their influence was unstable and short-lived. By 1950, for example, the PIR
had already split, and a portion of the former PIR members formed the Partido
Comunista de Bolivia (PCB). By the time o f the National Revolution in 1952, the POR
and the FSB had each factionalized into 14 different groups, and the PCB had divided
into nine different groups. These factions reflected the importance o f caudillos and
private interests in party organization at that time (Calderón 1989, 203-4).
The longstanding party that did emerge in the 1940s was the MNR. Founded by a
group o f frustrated middle-class politicians, the MNR attracted party members from the
former PIR as well as from labor, the urban middle classes, and, by 1952, even the rural
peasants. The trajectory that led the MNR to its position as a “large multigroup social
coalition” (Mitchell 1977, 5) by the 1952 Revolution was an important one. The MNR
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supported the coup that overthrew the tin baron oligarchy and brought General Gualberto
Villarroel (1943-1946) to power. VillarroePs government comprised an odd mix of
primarily inexperienced military officers prone to violence and a faction o f the MNR that,
in flexing its newfound political muscles, began to formulate a party agenda based on farreaching reforms (Klein 1971, 373). When Villarroel was eventually forced from the
presidential palace and violently killed in 1946,7 the MNR leadership was exiled.
During the following six years, known as the sexenio, the MNR began to actively
recruit party membership by setting up cells o f the MNR party elite and their friends in
various cities throughout the country. It also courted the labor sector heavily,
concentrating primarily on “friendly union leaders,” since it viewed this sector as a
potential ally for its reform-based agenda (Mitchell 1977, 27-29). Two o f their primary
recruitment strategies thus consisted largely o f providing local posts to friends and loyal
militantes and catering to the growing labor sectors through amicable union leaders. In
essence, the bases o f the political party - which has dominated party-based politics in the
country since the 1952 National Revolution - were originally constructed through
clientelist and corporatist linkages.
The 1930s and 1940s were marked with political instability, the growth o f short
lived and personalist-based political parties, economic crisis, and the decline o f the
country’s single and most important export. The social impact o f this decline included
widespread unemployment and underemployment and the politicization o f the
disenfranchised urban and rural sectors, many o f which became organized. In 1939, the
7 He was eventually dragged out to the streets by a mob o f students, teachers, and laborers in front o f the
Presidential Palace, shot, and hanged on a lamppost that directly faces the palace. That lamppost remains
to this day, perhaps as a reminder to successive presidents o f their potential fate if they do not effectively
address the demands o f the highly mobilized urban and rural lower classes.
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Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB) was founded, becoming the
most important attempt to unify the smaller labor organizations in the country prior to the
1952 Revolution. The Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros (FSTMB) was
established in 1944; it later developed into the most active branch o f the Central Obrera
Boliviana (COB) (García, et al. 2004, 34). While encouraged by some governments,8
these unions were in general systematically and violently repressed. By the period o f the
sexenio, when repression against them was the most pronounced, the unions were
actively mobilizing against the government.
Thus, by the end of the 1940s, the two-party system that had controlled Bolivian
politics since the end of the nineteenth century had completely diminished. In its place, a
set of short-lived and highly fragmented political parties emerged. The MNR was one o f
the few parties to outlive this period; its clientelist and corporatist recruitment strategies
enabled it to amass party support that crossed both classes and sectors. At the same time,
the very sectors it was attracting, including the CSTB and the FSTMB, had developed
their own organizational structures and were becoming increasingly vociferous in their
demands. The accelerated development o f new political actors took place while the
country experienced a severe economic crisis sparked by the steep decline o f the tin
industry. It is perhaps not surprising that in the context o f rapid political change,
economic crisis, and growing social upheaval that a revolution would take place. The
next section examines the 1952 National Revolution and the MNR-based single-party
system that emerged upon its successful transformation o f Bolivia’s political system.

8 During the military regime o f David Toro Ruilova (1936-1937), the unionization o f mines was mandatory
in cities like Oruro (Garcia 33).
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After the Revolution: the MNR and Single-Party Rule (1952-1964)
On the morning o f April 9, 1952, the MNR led a group o f civilians to take over
the government of Hugo Ballivián Rojas (1951-1952). What began as a rather
straightforward coup d’état turned into a countrywide rebellion, as groups o f mobilized
miners .fabriles, track drivers, university students, and campesinos joined forces with the
MNR in toppling Ballivián (García, et al. 2004, 37). The fighting lasted three days and
brought the MNR to power, with Víctor Paz Estenssoro as president. The initial
accomplishments of the so-called National Revolution were numerous and notable. The
new regime granted universal suffrage to all adults, age eighteen and older, and reduced
what was left of the army to a minimum. The government also nationalized all minerals
and created the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) to manage their extraction.
They founded the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) to control the
extraction and exportation of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. Finally, the MNR-led
government established a new national labor federation, called the Central Obrera
Boliviana (COB), to oversee the organization o f labor at the national level.
In instituting all of these reforms, the MNR built upon the support base it had
begun to amass prior to the revolution and captured the loyalty o f the unions, the rural
campesinos, and the growing middle class. Capitalizing on this overwhelming support,
Paz Estenssoro organized the MNR in an effort to make it the “political vertebrae” to
which all segments o f society were attached (Malloy 1977, 465). With the party’s fingers
on the pulse o f each sector, the government would in theory have relative autonomy to
assert its authority and dominance on the national stage.
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Rhetorically speaking, the project o f the MNR was largely a populist one. As a
“large multigroup social coalition,” the party supported a broad range o f ambiguous
national goals that appealed to many different groups from each o f the classes. For
example, it pitted the Bolivian “nación ” that is, Bolivian workers, the middle class, and
peasants, against the “anti-nación,” or la rosea and its allies, in an effort to consolidate
the loyalty of the wide majority of the population that had not benefited from the tin
industry. Maintaining this broad support, however, was not as easy as receiving it
initially. While the government worked to accomplish its own specific priorities, it
responded to the growing discontent and demands o f the members o f its coalition by
distributing jobs and resources in an effort to maintain internal control (Grindle 2003,
336).
Indeed, the original intentions of the MNR when it sparked the 1952 Revolution
were far from revolutionary. As in 1943, the party supported unconstitutional means of
gaining power in order to force itself into government. In 1952, their goal was to
maintain power á la the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico or the
Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela. The MNR had not anticipated, however, the
massive support it would receive from the highly mobilized unions and campesinos.
“Reluctant revolutionaries,” the party was unprepared to effectively manage the
revolutionary changes that they spearheaded after April 1952 (Klein 1992, 231). It is in
part for this reason that the MNR could not successfully control through co-optation the
groups that had helped it come to power.
Two groups had particular influence during the revolution and remained
influential after the MNR took over the government. For one, the peasantry was highly
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mobilized, and, having been armed in the days leading up to the Revolution, potentially
violent. They organized campesino unions and created formal militias that patrolled the
countryside. The armed threat that the campesinos posed largely served as the impetus
for the widespread land reform that the MNR pushed through in 1953 (Klein 1992, 234).
The second group that wielded unprecedented political influence was the newly formed
COB. The MNR established the COB in an effort to control through integration the
powerful leader of the FSTMB, Juan Lechín Oquendo. Formed as an “organization o f
social organizations”,9 the COB originally had an active role in the first MNR
administration. By allowing the COB to serve with the MNR under the principle o f cogobierno,10 the MNR sought to control the more militant branches o f the Central,
including the FSTMB. This strategy backfired, however, and the COB became a “semi
sovereign institution that challenged the M NR’s every move” (Gamarra and Malloy
1995,403).
The importance o f the FSTMB-tumed-COB should not be unexpected. As a
longstanding mono-exporting country, the nature o f Bolivia’s economy had consequences
for the labor movement. Whereas other countries instituted ISI as a growth strategy in
the mid-twentieth century, Bolivia’s export-based economy was extended until the 1970s,
putting the miners in a uniquely powerful position o f negotiation vis-a-vis the state
(Ibáñez 1998, 362-3). As a result, the power o f the COB continually grew throughout the

9 The COB included, at its foundation, the FSTMB, the Confederación de Trabajadores Fabriles,
Confederación Ferroviaria, Federación de Empleados de Bancos y Ramas Afines, Sindicato Gráfico,
Empleados del Comercio e Industria, Sindicato de Constructores y Albañiles, Sindicato de Planificadores,
and the Confederación de Campesinos y Federación Agraria (García,et al. 2004, 38).
10 COB members named three labor ministers to the first cabinet. Lechín was named the Minister o f Mines
and Petroleum (Klein 1992, 232).
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1950s and 1960s. During this time, the Central functioned organizationally at a level that
was on par with the state. As previously mentioned, its members had high positions in
the MNR-led government. At the same time, high-ranking government officials
including, at one point, President Paz, participated actively in the COB’s organizational
structure. The COB’s First Congress on October 31, 1954, for example, included the
attendance of Paz and other high-ranking MNR delegates (Garcia, et al. 2004, 38).
Like the MNR, the COB functioned in a hierarchical, corporatist manner. Made
up, at its bases, of myriad local unions, the Central organized itself into regional and then
national federations and confederations, with the Executive National Committee (CEN, in
Spanish) at the organization’s peak. The influence o f the COB over its members was allconsuming. As one author notes, for COB union members,
“Ya sea en el campo, la mina, la fábrica, el comercio o la actividad artesanal, la
manera de adquirir identidad palpable ante el resto de las personas y de ser
reconocido como interlocutor válido por las autoridades gubernamentales, es por
medio del sindicato. A hí queda depositada la individualidad social plausible, y el
sindicato se erige como el interlocutor tácito entre sociedad civil y Estado”
(García, et al. 2004, 43).

The COB functioned as a representative body for its members. Bolivian laborers o f all
shades defined themselves through the COB, and the COB represented that identity at the
national level.
The growing political strength and popularity of the COB throughout Bolivia
helped bring the demands of the workers to the national level. Its call for workers’ rights,
better wages, and other services contradicted the developmental aims o f the MNR, which
sought to pursue national growth through government austerity. These contradictory
logics o f consumption on the one hand and accumulation on the other (Malloy 1970)
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created serious tensions between the MNR and the COB, particularly in light o f the
country’s deepening economic crisis in the 1950s. By 1953, the country was essentially
bankrupt and the government was having difficulties providing food and other staples to
the population. Looking for financial relief, Paz Estenssoro signed a mineral purchasing
agreement with the United States in exchange for twice the amount o f aid to the country
and millions of dollars worth of food (Klein 1992, 238). This assistance from the United
States, while providing only temporary respite from the economic crisis, deepened
Bolivia’s external dependence on aid and aggravated tensions with the COB.
These tensions were exacerbated further when the government, under the
leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960), implemented an IMF-imposed
stabilization program to curb rising inflation. Rather than confront the ire o f the miners
and other labor sectors over this agreement, Siles Zuazo and his successor, Paz
Estenssoro (1960-1964), worked to increasingly exclude labor from governmental
negotiations by actively demobilizing the COB. At the same time, Paz Estenssoro was
quietly strengthening the military once more, in an attempt to reassert the state’s
monopoly o f authority over the armed urban and rural sectors o f Bolivian society (Malloy
1977, 473). In essence, the MNR was cutting the government off from the very social
sectors that had brought it to power, while simultaneously feeding the political force that
would eventually topple it in 1964. Thus, by the time the M NR’s twelve-year rale had
come to a close, economic crisis had largely overshadowed the revolutionary
achievements of the 1950s, and the political dominance o f the MNR had been surpassed
by the revitalized military and the ever-stronger labor sector.

33

In the twelve years of single party rale after the 1952 National Revolution, the
MNR made many attempts to construct a cross-class, catch-all party bonded to society
through clientelist and particularly corporatist linkages. Instead o f successfully co-opting
and integrating the organized sectors of Bolivian society to which it appealed, however,
the MNR failed to integrate and control these sectors and, specifically, the COB. In
essence, the MNR was unable to establish itself as the primary intermediary between the
state and society. Instead, it inadvertently bolstered the role o f the COB and the military,
creating two powerful and enduring political actors who would straggle for political
dominance from 1964 until the transition to democracy in 1982.
The Period o f Military Rule (1964-1978)
Indeed, when a military regime overthrew Paz Estenssoro’s government in 1964,
a new period of politics began in Bolivia. For one, the formal political dominance o f the
military was constantly clashing with the intransigent political force represented by labor.
The years of military rule were marked by an almost total repression o f the COB.
Notably, this period was the first since 1952 in which the COB was controlled by and
subordinated to the state. The mines, for example, were declared military zones in the
late 1960s in an effort to neutralize the negotiating power o f the FSTMB. In the 1970s,
with the arrival of the anti-left and extremely conservative regime o f Colonel Hugo
Banzer Suárez, the COB was actively dismantled. By July 1975, almost all o f the union
leaders had been incarcerated or forced into hiding (Garcia, et al. 2004, 59).
Throughout the 1960s and into the early part o f the 1980s, the COB experienced
serious blows to its organizational structure by successive military regimes that forcefully
worked towards its eradication. Yet, the Central never entirely disappeared. It continued
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to resist each military regime either clandestinely or openly and, at one point, was even
allowed to overtly organize at the national level.11 The reformist regimes o f the 1960s
and early 1970s were eventually toppled by a far more conservative and repressive
section of the military headed by Colonel Banzer. Along with banishing political parties,
Banzer jailed leaders of the COB and diminished the importance o f the campesino
groups, which had been actively courted by both the Barrientos and Torres
administrations. Under this environment o f centralized control, Bolivia experienced its
first economic boom in years (Klein 1992, 261).
Ironically, improvements in the economy also led to a resurgence in political
activity by the COB and the FSTMB. In 1976, at their National Congress, the miners
called for a hunger strike that lasted for four weeks before the armed forces could
suppress it. Their protest fueled growing demands for the return o f the exiled labor and
political leaders, the reorganization of labor, and even elections (Lazarte 1991, 587). The
COB’s success with initiatives such as this hunger strike reflected a growing
disenchantment throughout the country towards Banzer and his regime. Indeed, as the
COB grew in terms of support and unity, Banzer’s popularity - and popularity for
military regimes in general - began to decline sharply. By 1978, it was clear that military
leadership had run its course in Bolivia. In July o f that year, Banzer succumbed to the
growing internal resistance and called for democratic elections (Malloy and Gamarra
1988, 117).
11 In June 1970, with the collaboration in part o f the government o f General Juan José Torres (1970-1971),
the COB organized a Popular Assembly {Asamblea del Pueblo), The Assembly, which included the
participation o f 218 delegates from campesino groups and labor unions, among others, was intended to
replace the former Bolivian parliament (Klein 1992, 253). While it failed to materialize into a functioning
national body, the Popular Assembly did serve as an expression o f the CO B’s resilience throughout the
entire military period.
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The impact of this fourteen-year military period would be felt well beyond its
formal conclusion12 at the end of the 1970s. It left behind two clear legacies that, as the
following chapters will show, continued to affect political representation in the country
long after the transition to democracy. One clear legacy o f this period o f military rale
was the use of corporatism and clientelist-based patrimonialism by successive leaders for
controlling society and maintaining support for their non-constitutional rule. Under the
leadership of René Barrientos Ortuño (1964-1969°), for example, the government
actively courted the support of the rural campesinos, strengthening a Pacto Militar
Campesino (PMC) between this sector and the government. As a part o f the PMC, the
campesinos were organized into vertically structured groups that were controlled by local
garrison commands (Gray-Molina 2003, 350). Barrientos clearly employed a corporatist
logic in integrating the rural sectors into his government.
Other examples of corporatism abound during this period. In the 1970s, when the
COB had been declared illegal, Banzer organized labor through the establishment of
1000 coordinadores legales that were appointed by the Ministry o f Labor (Lazarte 1991,
584). Despite banning unionization during this time, these legal coordinators clearly
retained vertical structures for addressing labor, much in the same way that the COB did.
In 1974, on the heels of his autogolpe, Banzer also organized a corporatist-based
assembly without the participation of political parties (Gamarra 2003b, 295). These
examples demonstrate how the military sought to represent the country through sectoral
12 The military period formally ended in 1978, that is, elections were carried out in 1979 to replace the
military regime. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, the institution did not willingly cede its power.
Its attempts to retain control o f the government through 1982 would lead some scholars to call this fouryear period one o f “tortuous transition” (M alloy and Gamarra 1988, 117).
13 In actuality, Barrientos co-governed with General Alfredo Ovando until July 1966.
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interests instead of through political parties. In each case, labor was treated as a unified
body to be addressed directly by government.
Clientelism was also pervasive during this time, particularly towards the end of
the military period. By the end of the 1970s, for example, Banzer could no longer focus
on restructuring the state and encourage economic growth as he had done during his first
years in office. His popularity was, in fact, deteriorating rapidly. Thus, he turned his
energies to maintaining control of the government through the distribution o f jobs,
contracts, tax breaks, and concessions - whatever he could do to muster enough support
for his regime to continue (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 408). Indeed, with Banzer, the
military institution in general became known for its clientelist-based patrimonial
behavior. Under his centralized authority, the entire state apparatus was reduced to a
mere extension of the executive branch, around which all political and economic activity
revolved. As a result, the primary state-society linkage at this time centered on
“extremely fluid lines of personalized patron-client links” emanating from Banzer
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110).
The neopatrimonial nature of Banzer’s rule should not be surprising, as it was a
tendency that dominated politics in the country since before the National Revolution.
Patrimonialism emerged in Bolivia as a result o f the country’s prolonged dependence
upon publicly managed primary-product exportation, which stifled private sector growth
and centralized economic and job-producing resources into the state. Thus, the urban,
educated, job-seeking population in Bolivia inevitably turned to the state for
employment, converting the country’s middle class into its political class (Malloy 1977,
476). By providing jobs, successive political leaders secured the support o f those urban
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sectors, fostering a relationship based on mutual patron-client dependence. The middle
classes turned to politics as a means of employment; support for both military and
civilian rulers alike was thus based on their ability to employ. In Banzer’s case, this jobbased support translated into the dramatic growth o f the public sector from 66,000
employees in 1970 to 171,000 employees in 1977 (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 112),
The dominance of the military along with the COB after 1964 highlights the
second important legacy of the period. In effect, the role o f the traditional political
parties on the national scene was significantly reduced. For example, the MNR, after
having ruled for twelve years, virtually disappeared during this time, although it did serve
a subordinate (and temporary) role with Banzer’s government in the early 1970s.14 In
general, however, as the military and labor were in outright conflict over political control
in Bolivia, it was increasingly evident that political parties were not the sole intermediary
between state and society. The representative role o f successive military rales and the
COB matched that of the political parties. Political parties suffered as a result. Like the
POR, FSB, and the PCB o f the 1940s, the MNR experienced a period o f serious internal
fragmentation in the 1970s, weakening the party’s overall structure and diminishing even
further its national importance. At one point, the MNR was split into 31 different
factions (Calderón 1989, 202).
An important role that political parties did serve during this period was that of
opposition to the military regimes. This was particularly the case o f Banzer’s leadership
14 When Bánzer first came to power in 1971, he briefly shared government with the MNR and the FSB,
This coalition, called the Frente Popular Nacional (FPN), remained in power until 1974, when Banzer
declared an auto-coup and banished them from office. Scholars have called the MNR and the FSB “rump
factions” during this period. Bolstering party support through the provision o f public sector jobs, they did
little more than drain resources from Banzer, who wanted control o f the patronage flow for him self (Malloy
and Gamarra 1988, 109),
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in the 1970s, When the Popular Assembly took place in 1970, the former university
sector o f the MNR organized a group o f delegates and participated in the assembly under
a new name, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Klein 1992, 253).
After Banzer’s takeover, the MIR served as a principal source o f resistance to the
repressive military ruler. Two other leftist parties also emerged during this time and
joined the MIR in opposing Banzer: the leftist faction o f the MNR, known as the MNRI,
under the leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo, and the Partido Socialista (PS), which was
headed by Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz. Like the COB and the FSTMB, these new
parties were severely repressed and even abolished after Banzer’s autogolpe (Gamarra
and Malloy 1995,407).
Ironically, Banzer himself eventually became known as a strong defender o f
democracy. After his call for democratic elections in 1978, the military colonel
abandoned the military and established the civilian-based political party, Acción
Democrática Nacionalista (ADN). This ideologically conservative party incorporated
elements of the former FSB into its program and thus captured the support o f the private
sector and the urban elite who were alienated from the left-leaning opposition parties o f
the 1970s. During the years of tortuous transition, between 1979 and 1982, Banzer
became a fierce opponent of the military juntas that overthrew the civilian leadership o f
Walter Guevara Arce (August 1979-November 1979) and Lydia Gueiler Tejada
(November 1979-July 1980).15 As a result, Banzer was perceived as one o f the leading

15 Guevara was overthrown in a coup d ’état led by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch (1-16 November 1979).
Gueiler was overthrown in a coup d ’état headed by General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981),
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proponents of democracy at that time (Klein 1992, 270); his repressive military
leadership appeared to be all but forgotten by his supporters.
Thus, the 1960s and 1970s represented a time o f intense political conflict,
repression, and resistance. Notably, the political parties had to compete for its role as
intermediary with the military and the unions. Dominated by linkages based on
corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism, this period did not prepare
Bolivians for the representative democracy to come. The final section will look briefly at
the country’s difficult transition to democracy and highlight the important characteristics
o f its first and overwhelmingly unsuccessful attempt at coalitional rule.
The Tortuous Transition to Representative Democracy (1979-1985)
The transition period between 1978 and 198216 has been called “one o f the
darkest chapters in Bolivian political history” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 154) and
rightly so. In less than four years, the country had seven different leaders, only two o f
which were civilian. General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981) was the single
most ruthless and repressive leader that Bolivians had known in the twentieth century.
The sustained and systematic character o f his malevolence “terrified” Bolivian society
and wrecked havoc on his opponents and particularly labor, the campesinos, the Church,
and the left-leaning political parties (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 145). Indeed, the
obstinacy o f the military in relinquishing its hold on political power in the country
prolonged Bolivia’s transition process.

16 For an excellent analysis o f the transition to democracy in Bolivia, see Chapter Four o f Malloy and
Gamarra (1988).
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Yet, the military did eventually surrender national political control, and upon
Banzer’s call for elections, the political system was exposed to an outpouring o f formally
repressed state and non-state actors who wanted their piece o f the democratic action.
These groups included labor, the peasantry, a newly organized confederation for the
private sector, and regionally-based civic committees. More than democracy, these
groups each wanted to fill the power vacuum left behind by the military (Malloy and
Gamarra 1988, 118). The organizational and political successes o f each o f these groups
highlighted the failure of the political parties to capture that vacuum and replace the
military as the sole intermediary channel between the state and society. This was the case
even as a coalition o f left-leaning political parties, called the Unión Democrática y
Popular (UDP),17 was successful in electing their candidate, Hernán Siles Zuazo (19821985), to the presidency.
The political influence of the COB surged after 1978, primarily because o f its
important role in fomenting resistance to the military prior to the transition to democracy.
It was clearly in the COB’s interests of survival and growth to topple the military regime.
In the 1970s, the possibility of democracy presented itself, and the COB pursued it
doggedly. The hunger strikes and blockades outlined above worked toward this goal.
Even during the period o f García Meza, when the repression o f unions was at its height
(Garcia, et al. 2004, 66), the COB continued to organize and resist the military. The
COB’s role in bringing the tortuous transition to an end, as well as its extended history o f
political prominence in Bolivia, instilled in the COB a sense o f entitlement to political
power in 1982. As a result, once the UDP assumed power, the COB agreed to work only

17 The UDP consisted o f the MNRI, the MIR, and the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB).
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with the executive branch, bypassing political parties and the Congress entirely in the
pursuit o f its own interests (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 411). For the COB, direct access
to the executive was a right they had earned.
Bolivian businesses also became organized after 1978, forming the Confederación
de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). The CEPB represented private sector
interests, and, like the COB, it preferred to lobby directly with the executive after 1982.
Indeed, in terms of political influence at the national level, the CEPB became for the
private sector what the COB was for the working class (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 169).
The rural peasantry also organized during the transition period. In 1979, three different
i o

campesino organizations

r

came together to form the Confederación Sindical Unica de

Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB, which joined the COB
in 1981, became the strongest extra-institutional voice for campesinos (Klein 1992, 273)
and maintained its political relevance into the early 21st century. The COB, CEPB, and
the CSUTCB represented their constituents along corporatist lines, contradicting the logic
o f what was soon to become a representative democracy.
Another growing political force materialized at the regional level during this time.
In part due to Banzer’s development of the country’s eastern lowlands, regional rivalries
developed throughout Bolivia that began to vie for the resources o f the state even before
the transition to democracy. After 1975, however, regional civic committees attracted
more supporters by questioning the principles o f a centralized state (Calderón 1989, 210).
18 In 1978, three autonomous peasant confederations existed: the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos
(CNC), which had coordinated the PMC; the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MRTK), which
would later become a political force in the 1980s and 1990s; and Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari
(MITKA), also a political party at that time (M alloy and Gamarra 124-5). By 1979, the leaders o f the three
organizations came together to join a unified confederation, called the Confederación SindicalÚnica de
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB).
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They maximized their political backing by capitalizing on the clearly unstable and
vacuous central authority at that time. Their call for regional autonomy never subsided,
and it became a primary issue in the post-2003 political context.
The political parties that emerged during this time did so in a context o f weak
political power vis-a-vis the other rival political actors. Yet, once the ban on political
parties was lifted in 1978, more than seventy parties formed, the majority o f which were
merely an expression of personal ambitions. Called “taxi parties,” Bolivians joked that
the parties could “hold their conventions in a taxi cab” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 124).
The larger and more important political parties, including the MNR, the ADN, the UDP,
and even the FSB also capitalized on this period to gain political support.
What the parties did not lack in terms o f quantity, they did lack with respect to the
experience needed to manage the atrophied nature o f national politics after 1978. Indeed,
the presence and strength of the non-party actors during the transition reflected the initial
failure o f the political parties to fill the political vacuum left behind by the military. As
party politicians battled with the military for control o f the state, it was clear that there
was no central governing authority to effectively manage the country. Interests were thus
represented by the COB, CSUTCB, CEPB, and the Civic Committees. The sustained
presence of these groups even after the arrival o f the UDP to power reflects a much more
problematic consequence of the transition period: the parties were unable to recapture
political power once the chaos of the transition had subsided.
The inability o f the political parties to assert political control in the country
became apparent during the leadership o f Hernán Siles Zuazo o f the UDP (1982-1985).
The coalition had problems from the start. Despite their ideological similarities, the
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MNRI, MIR, and PCB had different goals for the administration. As a result, the
coalition began to fragment internally. The MIR became disaffected first. Unhappy with
what they perceived as Siles’ reliance upon international technocrats, his inability to
confront the emerging cocaine organizations, and his general lack o f an economic plan,
the six MIRista ministers collectively resigned from the president’s cabinet (Malloy and
Gamarra 1988, 168). Internal disagreements and fragmentations throughout the
administration forced Siles to spend much o f his time shuffling his cabinet and putting
out political fires with his allies.
Meanwhile, Bolivians were suffering the effects o f an already acute economic
crisis.19 Mounting international pressures to enact an austere economic program resulted
in the adoption o f a series of IMF-sponsored austerity packages designed to stabilize the
economy. These measures contradicted the ideology of the coalitional government and
ran counter to the demands of the coalition’s principal supporters and particularly the
COB (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 164). The government’s capitulation to international
demands angered the COB, which ultimately distanced itself from the UDP.
The independence o f the COB vis-a-vis the left-leaning political parties in the
UDP reflected those parties’ inability to maintain the overwhelming support their
coalition had received upon assuming office in 1982. Indeed, the Central exerted unusual
influence over the coalition’s economic and political decisions. For example, in 1983,
when Siles’ coalitional unity was faltering, the president invited the COB to join him in
co-goveming the country. His invitation was an attempt to control the organization by
19 The crisis, which began in the 1970s, accelerated under UDP rule. The growth rate o f the gross national
product (GNP) was falling, as was the GNP per capita: in 1981, this figure had fallen 4.1%, and by 1982, it
had dropped another 11.1%. Exports died off while the fiscal deficit almost doubled (Mayorga, R. 1987,
23).
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integrating it into government while also a clear appeal to the COB as his strongest non
state supporter. As a result, the COB produced a Programa de Emergencia, spelling out
its conditions for establishing co-gobierno, including miners5 control o f COMIBOL,
workers’ co-management of all other state enterprises, and the immediate postponement
o f all foreign debt servicing (Urioste 1987, 289). Before the UDP could reject or accept
this Program - they negotiated over the deal for months - the COB withdrew its offer for
co-gobierno, ultimately opting in 1984 to actively resist the UDP and push for a more
socialist government. By this time, the Central had become such a potent political force
that one author concluded that no government would ever be able to ignore the COB in
formulating an economic plan. The organization had become too powerful (Castro and
Gomez 1987, 196).
The growing role o f the COB in government alarmed the CEPB. Strongly
opposed to the socialist tendencies o f the COB, it began to act more vociferously in the
defense o f private sector interests. The intense and enduring conflicts that emerged
between the CEPB and the COB would complicate Siles’ governing capacities (Malloy
and Gamarra 1988, 169-172). The president tried to appease the antagonistic groups
through efforts of concertación, hoping to win the support o f the CEPB and the COB by
making concessions to both of them. The attempts were unsuccessful, however, and Siles
ended up satisfying neither group entirely (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 174). By 1985, it
was clear that the UDP was unable to effectively subordinate other national political
forces to its party-based political system. Indeed, the popularity o f groups like the COB
and the CEPB appeared to be growing.
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Thus, although the UDP represented the first instance o f political party rule in the
country after more than thirty years, it became clear very quickly that political parties did
not have a monopoly of representation or political control in Bolivia. In particular, the
COB and the CEPB appeared to be capturing the support o f new societal cleavages based
upon growing class differences. The COB’s strength and influence intensified during this
period, suggesting that it had retained the support o f most o f its urban poor and rural
followers despite the election of a left-leaning coalition. The CEPB became increasingly
organized in reaction to the COB, capturing the support of those urban sectors alarmed by
the Central’s growing influence. Thus, although the military had effectively disappeared
from national politics by the early 1980s, the fragility o f the party-based coalition in
power, along with the emergence and growing influence o f non-state actors during that
time, demonstrated the weak grip that political parties had over Bolivian society. Partysociety linkages of any kind by 1985 were largely absent.
Conclusion
The failure o f the UDP government brought to a close a tumultuous and
politically unstable era of history in Bolivia. Beginning with the dismantling o f the twoparty system of Liberals and Conservatives in the 1940s, centralized national control in
the country continually unraveled throughout the rest o f the twentieth century, despite
different attempts to transform the political system. The National Revolution sought to
restructure the country by opening up politics to greater participation and leveling the
political playing field between different classes and ethnicities. The military period
sought to stimulate economic growth and political order through mechanisms o f social
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control. The UDP attempted to incorporate different political actors into its decision
making process. In compromising with everyone, the coalition satisfied no one.
The legacies of these different political periods would not bode well for
representative democracy. For one, there existed a strong tendency by most political
actors, including the military, the COB, and the political parties, to appeal to society
along corporatist and clientelist lines. Thus, the tradition o f representation through
political parties (instead of through different sectors o f society) was cultivated only
through the establishment of highly dependent patron-client networks. In effect, the role
o f political parties as the sole intermediary between state and society was increasingly
challenged by that of other political actors, including the COB and the military,
throughout much of the second half of the 20th century in Bolivia.
Because the traditional political parties were unable to emerge as the primary
state-society intermediary before 1985, the linkages that those parties could create with
society were extremely limited. The MNR government o f 1952 and the UDP government
o f 1982 both employed mechanisms of corporatism, and, in the case o f the MNR,
clientelism, to appeal to and maintain the support o f the population at large. These were
the only two instances of clearly established party rule after the 1940s. The rest o f the
period saw other political actors, including the military and labor, actively working
against parties for their own political gain. In most instances, the political parties lost the
battle for national control:
“Estos intentos reiterados de eliminar a los partidos y de establecer vínculos sin
intermediarios entre los ciudadanos y el Estado ocurrieron durante momentos
autoritarios y afectaron, a la larga, la capacidad de los partidos de forjar
vínculos más amplios con la sociedad’ (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 15).
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Thus, by 1985, links between political parties and society were extremely
tenuous. Notions of corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism plagued
political behavior, and other non-state actors had emerged that could hold their own in
the straggle for political power. Given the dramatically unstable environment in which
elections took place in 1985, it was remarkable that a political system was finally forged
that, in spite o f the legacies of the fifty years past, could ensure governance and stability
in the country. Entering into the “honeymoon period” o f the political party system
(Chávez, et al. 2004), however, the consequences o f the political and economic reforms
of that year were not entirely positive. Chapter Three looks at the period o f stable party
system rule in Bolivia, making the case for why the party system —despite its emergence
against all odds in 1985 - was ultimately unsustainable.
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III.

THE BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM
In 1985, although Bolivia’s economic and political systems were close to

shambles, the country was able to pull off a successful round o f free and fair elections.
Víctor Paz Estenssoro, who became president for the third time that year, and his
administration instituted a coalition-style government, based on the principle o f pacted
democracy, and at the same time implemented a strict economic austerity package, called
the Nueva Política Económica (NPE). These two reforms stabilized the economy and
relocated political authority in the state, allowing for the successful formulation o f four
more administrations between 1989 and 2002. As the pages to follow demonstrate,
pacted democracy and the NPE also impacted the traditional political party system’s
ability to maintain its linkages with society.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will examine in detail the
components of both pacted democracy and the NPE, as well as the successes o f each in
returning the locus of political and economic control to the state. In particular, they
enabled reforms in the 1990s that would not have been possible prior to the democratic
transition given the atrophied nature of politics during that time. Yet, pacted democracy
and the NPE had a detrimental impact on the linkages that existed between society and
the state at the same time that the traditional political party system took over the role as
sole intermediary. For one, the corporatist linkages fostered by the COB were essentially
eradicated with the Central’s demise after the adoption o f the NPE. Meanwhile, the
principle of pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial behaviors that dominated the
political system prior to the transition to representative democracy. It also fostered
executive-centric policymaking and a strong internal political party hierarchy, preventing
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party democratization and inhibiting the formation of party-society linkages beyond that
o f clientelist-based neopatrimonialism.
The second objective of the chapter is to outline the growing economic and social
problems in Bolivia by the end of the 1990s. As the country entered into an extended economic recession, Bolivian society underwent social changes fueled by the crisis.
These changes included the increase of unemployment and underemployment with a
simultaneous rise in university graduates. At the same time, new political parties and
social movements emerged that expressed different sectors’ discontent toward the
traditional political party system and threatened the monopoly o f representation secured
by that system since 1985. As Roberts argues in his party-society framework, by the end
o f the 1990s, the conditions were set in Bolivia for the dealignment o f the traditional
political parties from society. Facing prolonged economic crisis and social change, the
traditional political party system confronted major shifts in societal demands.
Thus, the following pages address the successes o f the economic and political
models adopted in 1985 as well as their unintended consequences for the linkages that
connected the traditional political party system with society. Given the economic crisis
and the subsequent social changes of the late 1990s, the limitations o f the existing
clientelist-based linkage would become evident as different Bolivian sectors turned their
support toward the newly formed political parties and social movements. Ironically, the
successes o f the 1985 political and economic model would ultimately be detrimental to
the traditional political party system’s monopoly o f representation in the country, setting
the stage for party system decline after 2000.
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The Era o f Policy-Making: Pacted Democracy and the NPE
The outcome of the 1985 presidential elections was close; indeed, elections
between 1985 and 2002 never produced a simple majority winner.20 Whereas the ADN’s
candidate, Hugo Bánzer, received the highest number of popular votes, the M NR’s
second place finisher, Paz Estenssoro, eventually assumed the presidency. Despite anger
among party factions in both the ADN and the MNR, the two party leaders forged a pact
that put Paz Estenssoro in the presidency and guaranteed that the ADN would support his
leadership by creating an MNR-friendly congressional majority. The legislative coalition
would back Paz Estenssoro in exchange for the M NR’s support for an ADN presidency in
1989.
The MNR-ADN coalition, which was called the Pacto por la Democracia, would
be the first of five coalitions formulated under the principle of pacted democracy. This
innovative approach to governance was successful in resolving any potential impasse
between the president and the legislature in Bolivia, ensuring political stability on the one
hand and governance on the other. Indeed, because they could count on the support o f a
Congressional majority, the successive presidents between 1985 and 2002 were
successful in implementing important social, political, and economic reforms. Given the
historic struggle for power and authority that existed in the country prior to 1985, the
accomplishments o f pacted democracy cannot be overstated. It was clear from the
beginning of the MNR-ADN alliance that conditions for a “stable and conventional
regime” had been set in the country (Whitehead 2001, 28).
20 Article 90 o f the 1967 Constitution stipulated that, if no presidential candidate received 50% of the votes
plus one, the President would ultimately be elected by Congress in a second round race among the top three
popular vote recipients. In 1994, this rule was changed so that only the top two recipients could be
considered for President.
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The principle of pacted democracy also underscored the nature o f the democratic
regime that was put into place in 1985. Called a “hybrid presidential” regime, Bolivia’s
government consisted of both parliamentary and presidential characteristics (Gamarra
1997» 363-4). As mentioned above, if first round general presidential elections did not
gamer a majority (50% plus one) winner, the Congress was responsible for electing the
president. All in all, the “mainspring of the system [was] a dynamic common in
parliamentary regimes: the politics of coalition” (Mayorga, R.1997, 149). Electoral
coalitions allowed parties to appeal broadly to their constituents, and coalitions within
Congress chose the president. Once the president had been chosen, however, the
principles o f presidentialism took over. The legislative function there after served to
support the coalitional government in place, and the executive branch was not beholden
to parliamentary confidence.
Thus, the primary political actors after 1985 were the political parties that
comprised each ruling coalition. While the transition to democracy had produced more
than seventy different political parties, the actual alternation o f power after 1985 was
focused on the three traditional political parties, the MNR, the MIR, and the ADN. This
was due in part to a political reform in 1979, which abruptly halted the explosion of
political parties by requiring those parties that did not receive 50,000 votes in a given
election to pay for their share of ballot printing costs (Van Cott 2000, 166). The reform
helped establish a political party system consisting primarily o f the three traditional
political parties, because they had the financial and political resources to fulfill the
requirements o f the 1979 legislation.
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From 1985 to 2002, then, the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as the traditional parties in
the country’s political party system, alternated the presidency. Between 1985 and 1989,
Paz Estenssoro led the Pacto por la Democracia. In the period o f 1989-1993, Jaime Paz
Zamora (MIR) became president with the support o f the Acuerdo Patriótico, an alliance
between the MIR, the ADN, and the small, Christian Democrat party, the Partido
Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). After 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR, 19931997) assumed office through the Pacto por la Gobernabilidad. This coalition included
the MNR along with the MRTK, an MIR spin-off called the Movimiento Bolivia Libre
(MBL), and the Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS). In 1997, Hugo Bánzer (ADN, 19972002)

21

became the president with the support o f the Compromiso por Bolivia, a coalition

that consisted o f the MIR, UCS, PDC, Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), and the Nueva
Fuerza Republicana (NFR).
The composition o f each successive coalition is noteworthy. For one, pacted
democracy clearly brought together parties that, programmatically speaking, were
complete opposites. The Acuerdo Patriótico, for example, consisted o f the MIR and the
ADN - two parties that were ideological antitheses. Moreover, while the three traditional
political parties headed each of these coalitions, it is notable that other small parties allied
with the MNR, MIR, or ADN in order to gamer the seats necessary for a congressional
majority. Over time, these coalitions grew: whereas the Pacto por la Democracia had
only two political parties, the Compromiso por Bolivia included six. The evolution o f
these pacts highlights three electoral features o f Bolivia’s political party system. First, in

21 In 2000, Banzer resigned because o f serious complications from an illness, which would eventually take
his life. His vice president, Jorge Quiroga, assumed the presidency after his resignation and served out the
rest o f the term.
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the straggle for the presidency, none o f the traditional political parties ever received a
clear majority. Second, the voting share of each o f the parties rarely grew and in most
cases dropped with each successive election; hence the need for a greater number of
parties to obtain a majority. Finally, the appearance o f new political parties suggests that,
while the traditional parties maintained primary control of the party system, they were
unsuccessful in maintaining their constituent base over the medium to long term.
At the same time that the principle of pacted democracy was adopted, Paz
Estenssoro and his administration were also working frantically to implement a package
o f economic reforms that could effectively address the “perilous state” o f the Bolivian
economy in 1985 (Grindle 2003, 323). On August 29, 1985, the president enacted
Supreme Decree 21060, or the Nueva Política Económica (NPE), as his response to the
crisis. An orthodox economic shock program, the objectives o f the NPE were to end
hyperinflation and adopt the foundations of a market-oriented economy. Measures
incorporated into the NPE included devaluation, liberalization, wage and salary freezes,
and the reduction o f the public sector. Called a “silent revolution,” the NPE represented
a completely new approach to economic development, changing the former model o f
state-based growth and opening the economy to foreign investment and trade (Mayorga,
R, 1997).
The NPE was initially successful in curbing inflation and stimulating growth. By
1987, inflation had fallen from its 1985 peak o f 20,000 percent to a much more
manageable 14.5 percent. The GNP registered positive growth, at 4.7 percent, and per
capita income had climbed almost US$200.00 from its 1985 figure to US$620.00
(Grindle 2003, 324). Following his predecessor’s lead, when Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-
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1993) took over the presidency, he continued with the austere economic principles
adopted in 1985. In particular, in 1990 he issued Supreme Decree 22407, which
continued to privatize industry and downsize the public sector. By 1992, 100 o f the 159
state-owned enterprises had been sold to the private sector (Grindle 2003, 324).
The implementation of the NPE represented one o f the first decisive actions o f the
Pacto por la Democracia, leaving little doubt that the locus o f political and economic
control had been returned to the state. Yet, upon announcing the policy, Paz Estenssoro
was met with considerable resistance from the labor unions as represented by the COB.
The Central wanted to compensate for the austere nature o f the NPE by increasing
workers’ wages. Instead of addressing these demands or attempting to negotiate with the
COB, as his predecessor Siles Zuazo had done, Paz Estenssoro literally dismantled the
unions. He shut down union headquarters and arrested their leaders, and he closed
COMIBOL, which resulted in the laying off o f 23,000 o f the 28,000 miners (Healy
1988/1989, 100). Between 1985 and 1987, the total work force in state-owned
companies fell from 32,000 to 7,000 (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 203), and by 1988,
public sector employment had been reduced by 17 percent (Grindle 2003, 324). Under
SD 22407, these figures presumably declined even more.
The impact of these repressive measures was immediate. The COB was almost
completely destroyed, its material bases effectively purged because o f the massive lay
offs. By the end o f the 1980s, the COB would be little more than a “shadow o f its former
s e lf’ at the national level (Healy 1988/1989, 100). Thus, the NPE eradicated one o f the
*

tVi

most active and influential political actors o f the mid- to late 20 century. Moreover, by
dismantling the Central, Paz Estenssoro effectively removed the corporatist linkage that
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had connected the COB with society. As one author notes, by the end of the 1980s, the
demands o f the COB had been, for all intensive purposes, “pulverized” (Garcia, et al.
2004, 625).
By breaking down the Central, the corporatist bonds that had unified the labor
sectors were broken down as well. Consequently, the poor urban and rural classes, who
had largely identified with and were organized through the COB, found themselves
without the primary intermediary structure that had represented their demands since the
National Revolution. These disenfranchised classes would thus need to look elsewhere and presumably to the traditional political party system - for representation. With the
adoption of the principle o f pacted democracy and the NPE, then, Paz Estenssoro
effectively set the stage for a period of renewed economic growth and for a democratic
regime in which the traditional political parties - and no longer the COB - would be the
sole intermediary between society and government.
The effects of these accomplishments were profound in terms o f governance.
Bolstered by four successive rounds of executive-friendly Congressional majorities, the
1990s served as a decade for implementing innovative political, social, and economic
policies and laws. After nearly fifty years o f unstable regimes, it was significant that,
beginning in 1985, the country’s political system was finally able to make decisions on
policy and, more importantly, act upon those decisions.
The achievements of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s (MNR, 1993-1997)
presidency in terms of reforms reflected a clear example o f the government’s
policymaking capabilities after 1985. In 1993, Sánchez de Lozada became the president
o f Bolivia for the first time with the promise o f enacting far-reaching reforms that would
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change both the social and political design o f the country and its strategy for growth and
investment. El Plan de Todos included the formal recognition for the first time o f the
rights of the indigenous peoples of the country; the capitalization o f state-owned industry,
through the Law of Capitalization; education reform; and political and fiscal
decentralization, through the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) and the Law o f
Decentralization.22 Along with El Plan de Todos, constitutional reforms were also
adopted in 1994, creating single member districts for 50 percent o f the seats in Congress’
lower house, extending the presidential term to five years, and amending Article 90 so
that only the top two presidential contenders could be considered in the second round
congressional elections23 (Gamarra 2003a, 306).
It is important to mention the success o f El Plan de Todos and the constitutional
reforms, because they signal the extent to which the role o f political and economic
decision-making was returned to the Bolivian state. Prior to 1985, as Chapter Two
describes, political control was divided among many different state and non-state actors.
In the years following the adoption o f the NPE and pacted democracy, this political
atrophy was no longer evident. Indeed, Bolivia’s political system became a model of
stability in the region (Interview D, 6 May 2005). Upon eliminating the destabilizing
threat represented by the corporatist-based demands o f the COB and guaranteeing
legislative support o f the executive branch, Bolivia achieved stability and was able to
govern for the first time in decades.

22 A detailed look at each o f the aspects o f El Plan de Todos is beyond the scope o f this study. However,
other academics examine the impact o f the Plan’s components, including Gamarra (2002), Grindle (2003),
Gray-Molina (2003), and Kohl (2003).
23 Previously, the top three candidates could vie for the presidency.
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Throughout the 1990s, Bolivia was heralded internationally for its capacity to
recover from a difficult transition period and establish a democratic and stable political
system. Yet, the impact of the successes o f pacted democracy and the NPE, including in
terms o f political stability and the introduction of reforms, was not entirely positive. As
the next section illustrates, the economic and political models adopted after 1985 would
become seriously problematic for the traditional political party system, underscoring its
dependence upon neopatrimonialism and weakening the traditional political parties’
capacity to forge new linkages with society. Moreover, they inadvertently fostered the
emergence of new political actors that would challenge the traditional political party
system’s authority.
Unintended Consequences: Assessing Governance in Bolivia
The principle of pacted democracy and the alternation o f political control among
the three traditional political parties, while creating the conditions for govemability and
reforms, fostered other outcomes that negatively impacted the traditional political party
system. Specifically, the nature of pacted democracy promoted neopatrimonialism,
encouraged executive-centric policymaking, and prevented the internal democratization
o f the political parties. As a result o f these tendencies, the role o f the traditional political
parties within the political system was drastically reduced, limiting their capacity to forge
linkages with Bolivian society.
The very nature o f pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial relationships
that had long connected the political parties to Bolivian society and particularly the
urban-based middle-cum-political class. The dependence upon coalition-building,
combined with the ultimate independence o f the executive branch from congressional
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confidence, cultivated the tendency for the traditional political parties to focus on
securing and maintaining inter-party coalitional support. That is, successive but varied
coalitions of generally the same resource-hungry political parties created governments
focused on “the recomposition of client-patron networks and [the] redistribution o f
political patronage” (Gamarra 1997» 392). This logic of empleomanía shaped political
party competition in the formulation of pacts and ensured the survival o f the coalition
once the president was elected. As a result, in order to perpetuate their role in the
political system, the traditional political parties were often more interested in controlling
patronage than they were in governing effectively (Gamarra 1997, 376-8).
It is important to remember, too, that one o f the measures o f the NPE mandated
the drastic reduction of the public sector. While this was ultimately detrimental to the
COB, eradicating the organizational and material resources needed to maintain its
linkages with the poor urban and rural classes, it also had a negative impact on the
linkages that connected the traditional political parties with the middle class. Because
politics was essentially “the only game in town” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 80) for
urban, middle class job-seekers, when the opportunities for employment were drastically
reduced through the NPE, the support base o f the traditional political parties was also
severely threatened. The traditional political parties presumably had to scramble to fulfill
their patronage-based promises in what was left o f the public sector. Thus, the dynamics
o f the political system reinforced the neopatrimonial role o f the traditional political
parties as patronage pushers, even as their capacity to follow through on those promises
diminished.
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Another feature of the post-1985 political system was the executive-centric nature
o f decision-making. The principle of pacted democracy guaranteed the president a
Congressional majority that would consistently back his policies. With the support o f
this legislative majority assured, the need to work with Congress in formulating policies
was greatly reduced. As a result, the executive branch controlled most o f the decision
making power. The president and his cabinet were able to largely bypass the political
parties in Congress in the policymaking process (Gamarra 1997, 375), preferring instead
to use technocrats for the formulation of policies and to impose those policies through
executive or supreme decree.
In fact, the extensive use of technocrats and decrees prevailed throughout the
1980s and 1990s. The clearest example o f both o f these phenomena occurred with the
NPE. Dissatisfied with the strategy proposed by the M NR’s own economic team, Paz
Estenssoro consulted with an independent group o f technocrats, including two Harvard
academics, famed economist, Jeffrey Sachs, and two businessmen, to construct the NPE
(Conaghan 1992, 216). The NPE actually came into effect with Paz’s Supreme Decree
21060. Thus, the economic policy was largely a result o f a handful o f individuals and a
presidential decree. Despite boasting a pro-government coalition in an effort to promote
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, in this instance the Congress
was bypassed almost entirely.
Other examples of decretismo and the use o f technocrats abound. Paz Estenssoro
issued most o f his economic and social reforms through Supreme Decree; Paz Zamora
followed his predecessor’s lead when he deepened the NPE through SD 22407. Sánchez
de Lozada’s El Plan de Todos was shaped almost in its entirety by international and
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national advisors who were not affiliated to any political party. MNR party members, for
example, were not involved in the development of the LPP; ministers were even denied
access to meetings on the topic (Grindle 2003, 331-332).
The use of technocrats and decrees in the formulation and implementation of
policy - particularly in the case of the most important reforms o f the period - fostered the
perception that political parties were nothing more than electoral vehicles for presidential
candidates (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Once the president was elected, consultation with
Congress and with party members in general was not a priority. Thus, the role o f the
political parties in the legislative branch was to provide little more than tacit support to
executive-induced and executive-formulated policies.
The concentration o f decision-making power into the executive branch was
reinforced by a hierarchical organizational structure within the traditional political parties
themselves. The leaders o f the MNR, MIR, and ADN wielded an unrivalled political
influence over political party members, reducing the role o f those members considerably
within the party (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 8-9). Each party leader formulated the
policies that would be filtered down to, carried out, and supported by the other members
and representatives of his party. The top-down nature o f the traditional political parties
inhibited internal party democratization and the formulation o f local and regional leaders.
In essence, the traditional party leaders were the political parties.
In recognition of the need to decentralize the hierarchical nature o f political
authority within the parties, Congress passed the Law o f Political Parties in 1997. The
Law imposed gender and ethnic-based quotas for party candidates and called upon the
parties to develop a primary system through which those candidates would be selected.
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Yet, the traditional political parties failed in their efforts to internally democratize. While
filled with good intentions, the Law of Political Parties was never actually enforced and
was only ratified in 1999 (Mayorga, F. 2004). Instead o f democratizing internal political
party structures, the Law only succeeded in raising the expectation that such reforms
might take place. When they never actually did, a burgeoning mistrust and animosity
toward the traditional political parties was reinforced (Mayorga, F. 2004).24
Pacted democracy, then, proved to be a double-edged sword for Bolivia’s
traditional political party system. While creating the conditions for governance and
policy-making, it also fostered neopatrimonialism and executive-centric policymaking
and reinforced the internal hierarchical nature o f the political parties. In effect, the
principle o f pacted democracy restricted the role o f the primary actors o f the political
system, that is, Bolivia’s traditional political parties. Their responsibilities did not extend
beyond the promotion o f patronage and their duty to implicitly support their party leader
and, when they were part o f the executive-friendly coalition, their president.25
The severely diminished role of the political parties within the context o f pacted
democracy limited their abilities to foster linkages with society. As one author notes, in

24 In fact, the dislike for the traditional political party system and the three political parties that comprised it
was evident from early on after the transition to democracy. Many scholars have noted that “opinion polls
consistently [placed] parties in a highly unfavorable light,” and “politicians and their parties [were]
perceived as corrupt, and distrust o f politicians is profound” (Domingo 2003, 147 and Gamarra 2003, 12).
As early as 1989, scholars sought to understand why the MNR, MIR, and the ADN were so strongly
“questioned” by Bolivian society (Calderón 1989). Clearly, the traditional political parties faced an uphill
battle in terms o f connecting with Bolivian society.
25 That is not to say that the political parties were beholden to remain loyal to the president upon joining the
pact that elected him. In fact, political parties could and periodically did abandon the ruling coalition and
join the Congressional opposition. Condepa left the Compromiso po r Bolivia (1997-2002) along with the
NFR, which also was a late joiner to and early abandoner o f Sánchez de Lozada’s second term in office
(2002-2003). Notably, none o f the three traditional political parties ever abandoned a coalition once they
joined it.
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the 1990s, the traditional political parties were reduced to little more than electoral
machines and repartidores de cargos (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Loyal party militants
during campaign periods were rewarded with jobs and other benefits between election
cycles, underscoring the neopatrimonial nature o f inter-party bargaining in the formation
o f pacts and keeping party members from addressing the demands o f the electorate.
As a result, after 1985 and particularly in the 1990s, the linkage that the
traditional political parties were able to maintain with society was centered on clientelistbased neopatrimonialism and, more specifically, the circulation o f jobs. Indeed, job
distribution in the public sector was widespread through 2002. As Table 3.1 in Appendix
1 indicates, employment in the non-financial public sector remained steady between 1994
and 2002, despite the growing economic recession that hit Bolivia after 1998 (discussed
in detail in the next section). Specifically, in 1994, non-financial public sector employees
were 7.79% of the estimated economically active population. By 2002, this percentage
had only dropped marginally to 6.64%. In actual numbers, although the change in public
sector employment was negative, it represented a total increase o f 17,769 workers (IMF
2000, 2003).
Employment in the central administration alone also remained remarkably steady.
Between 1994 and 2002, the number of workers in the central administration, taken as a
percentage o f the economically active population, had only diminished by 0.36%. Given
the deepening economic recession after 1998, the increase in the number o f workers
required to maintain the central administration employment levels as a percentage o f the
active population was notable, particularly given the NPE-mandated decline in public
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sector employment after 1985.26 These figures demonstrate the importance o f the
circulation of state-based jobs in the 1990s. They support the contention that the
traditional political parties were dependent upon these posts and upon empleomanía in
general, even when that support contradicted the principles o f the state’s economic
policy.
The adoption of the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE provided an
unprecedented opportunity in Bolivia’s political history for the traditional political
parties. By eradicating the political force o f other pre-1985 actors such as the COB, the
traditional political party system became the sole voice o f expression and mediation
between the state and society. Yet, the unintended consequences o f political stability,
that is, the promotion o f patrimonialism, executive-centric policymaking, and hierarchical
internal party structures, diminished the role o f the traditional political parties in the
political system, preventing those parties from fostering linkages with society beyond that
o f neopatrimonialism. As the next section argues, the strength o f this clientelist-based
linkage would be tested by the serious economic and social changes taking place by the
end o f the 1990s.
Economic Crisis and Social Change in Bolivia in the 1990s
Bolivia’s economy underwent a great deal o f fluctuation between 1985 and 2003,
experiencing periods o f both modest growth and modest decline. Notably, despite the
privatization measures in 1985, as mandated by the NPE, and the capitalization law
enacted with Sánchez de Lozada’s Plan de Todos, the country’s growth rates never

26 Between 1998 and 2002, the total number o f workers employed by the central administration increased
by 5,201 (IMF 2000,2003).
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skyrocketed and rarely climbed above 5% o f GNP. Indeed, as one economist asserts,
since 1950, the country’s average growth rate was just below three percent. At its height,
growth topped seven percent of GNP in different years during the 1960s and 1970s.
Negative growth rates reached almost -10 percent o f GNP in 1953, dipping again in 1957
as well as during the UDP administration (UDAPE 2004, 12).
The economic recession of 1998 intensified these fluctuations in growth,
exacerbating the longstanding unstable nature o f Bolivia’s economy. Appendix 1
includes three different tables that reveal the nature and impact o f this recession, which
lasted for more than five years. Table 3.2 portrays the sharp drop in the annual growth
rate o f Bolivia’s economy, as a percentage of GDP, between 1998 and 1999. From a
growth rate of over five percent by 1998, the drop to just above zero was quite dramatic,
especially since it came on the heels of a relatively stable growth period between 1994
and 1998. The country had yet to recuperate from that drop by 2002, although the rates
o f growth did increase again after 2000.
Accompanying the ensuing economic recession after 1998 was an increase in
open unemployment rates, as Table 3.2 also indicates. Importantly, whereas the economy
began to recover its positive growth rate after 2000, unemployment continued to rise. By
2003, the rate o f the unemployed topped ten percent. At its height, in 2003, it reached
12.3 percent. The Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA)
has projected that the unemployment rate will remain in the double digits at least through
2005 (CEDLA, 04/29/05).
Table 3 .3 depicts the fiscal deficit between 1985 and 2005 (projected), indicating
that the debt o f the Non-Financial Public Sector (SPNF in Spanish) with pensions had
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reached a level similar to that of 1985» or at the height o f the economic crisis o f the UDP,
While the deficit subsequently decreased after peaking in 2002, Table 3.3 demonstrates
that the government was spending beyond its means throughout the 1990s and even more
so during the peak o f the economic recession at the end o f the 1990s. Clearly, the
principles of economic austerity as advocated by the NPE were no longer being pursued
by the state. Indeed, since 1990 and most likely before then, Bolivia’s government
consistently spent more money than It received (UDAPE 2004, 22).
The effects of the post-1998 economic recession extended far beyond the macroeconomic level. For one, World Bank figures indicate that the gross national income
(GNI) per capita dropped by nine percent between 1999 and 2003. Whereas the average
income per capita was US$990 at the end of 1999, that figured had dropped to US$900
by 2003. The implications o f this loss are much more significant given the percentage o f
the population that lives below the poverty line in Bolivia, or 62.7 percent in 1999 (WDI
2004). Moreover, although government expenditures consistently exceeded Its annual
budget, spending in most social sectors dropped during this period. As Table 3.4
indicates, after 1998, investments in basic sanitation and housing and urban planning
experienced a net decline. Investments in education and culture and health also declined
after 2000, despite surges In investment in these areas when the economic recession
began.
The impact of the 1998 economic recession, then, was felt at the individual and
familial levels. For one, the sharp decrease in per capita incomes aggravated an already
untenable poverty level in the country. Moreover, the drop in social sector Investment
exacerbated the government’s inability to address the basic demands o f the impoverished
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urban and rural sectors. Notably, despite the social impacts o f the economic recession,
enrollment rates at the university level grew sharply at the end o f the 1990s. In 1996,
total enrollment in public universities was at 151,260 students; the newly enrolled in that
year accounted for 29,222 of that total. By 2002, the number of total enrolled had
jumped to 240,428, reflecting an increase o f 89,168 students, or 59%. The newly
enrolled totaled 42,782 in 2002, which denotes a 46% increase in the number o f enrolled
students during the seven-year period (UDAPE Dossier, 2004). The increases in
enrollment reflected a general demographic boom in the country that occurred in the
1990s: between 1992 and 2001, the overall population o f Bolivia increased by 28.8%
(M E 2003).
As these data illustrate, Bolivia entered into a period o f economic recession after
1998 that not only exacerbated the country’s financial debts but also aggravated
unemployment and underemployment levels. At the same time, university graduation
rates sky-rocketed along with the country’s overall population, increasing the number of
educated job-seekers just as employment rates were dropping. By the end o f the 1990s,
then, Bolivia was experiencing the kind of profound economic problems that Roberts
highlights in his party system decline framework. The social impact o f this growing
crisis, including a simultaneous increase in an educated population and unemployment,
fueled a growing frustration among Bolivians toward the political system - and the
traditional political parties - that had enabled such a crisis to take place (Interview A, 4
May 2005). It is not surprising, then, that just as the frustration toward the traditional
political parties was mounting, new political parties and social organizations emerged to
reflect that discontent.
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The Emergence o f Alternatives to the Traditional Political Party System
The latter-half of the 1990s was marked by the emergence o f several new
political leaders with strong, albeit in some cases ephemeral, popular support. The
appearance of five political parties during the decade reflected the growing
“informalization o f politics” in Bolivia, that is, a process by which political parties
developed in the periphery and specifically against the traditional political party
structures (Lazarte 1991, 595). In particular, the UCS, Condepa, the Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS), the Movimiento Indio Pachacuti (MIP), and the NFR came to the
national fore during the 1990s, representing a growing challenge to the traditional
political parties’ electoral and political dominance.
The UCS and Condepa were founded in the latter half o f the 1980s by Max
Fernández and Carlos Palenque respectively. Both parties rose to meteoric levels of
popularity upon their creation, primarily because o f the popularity o f the two leaders.
Fernández and Palenque were viewed as humble individuals who, in contrast with the
elite-bom traditional party leaders, worked hard to get where they were (Mayorga F.
2003, 104). Fernández, the president of the country’s beer company, used his vast
material resources to carry out obras visibles (visible works), winning more popular
support every time he paved a road. Palenque, a television personality for the urban and
primarily indigenous poor, had broad charismatic appeal because he was culturally
similar to his constituents: they dressed the same, spoke the same, and carried out the
same rites and traditions (Lazarte 1991, 594).
Both parties emerged as a popular alternative to the traditional political parties
because, as one author argues, they fulfilled the role o f provider (“asistencialistd’) that
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the traditional parties could not fill given the adoption of both pacted democracy and the
NPE (Mayorga F. 2003, 104). The campaigns and campaign promises o f the UCS and
Condepa revolved around the provision o f hospitals, schools, and playgrounds. Palenque
and Fernández appeared to give directly from their pockets, presiding over the ribboncutting ceremony of each of their visible works. In this way, they cultivated a
charismatic, almost personal relationship with their followers, creating a direct link
between their constituents and themselves (Lazarte 1991, 600-601). Their actions were
also clientelist in nature. Most of the votes they garnered were a result o f the public
services they provided.
While both the UCS and Condepa heavily criticized the traditional political party
system, they ultimately joined forces with it in the 1990s. They gave their implicit
support to pacted democracy and to the hegemony o f the three traditional political parties
when they joined those parties in two different ruling coalitions (Mayorga, F. 2003,
108).27 By the end o f the decade, however, new political parties had emerged that were
not supportive of the traditional party leaders nor the political system that sustained them.
The MAS and the MIP are examples of these “anti-systemic” parties (Gamarra 2003a, 4).
The MAS was established as the political wing o f the Six Federations of coca
growers in the Chapare region. Building Its bases Initially through the defense o f the
cocalero" s right to cultivate his crop, the M AS’ popularity expanded rapidly at the end o f
the 1990s. This was largely because of the appeal o f its anti-American stance after the

27 Specifically, the UCS formed part o f the Pacto po r la Gobernabilidad (1993-1997), under Sánchez de
Lazada, and both UCS and Condepa joined the ADN in the Compromiso p o r Bolivia (1997-2002), although
Condepa would later withdraw from the pact.
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controversial implementation of Plan Dignidad?* Since then the MAS challenged, both
formally in Congress and informally in the streets, the neoliberal, pro-American stances
o f the Banzer and second Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) administrations. Like
Palenque and Fernández, Morales has tremendous charismatic appeal and has
accumulated a lot of political and even financial capital, not just domestically but also at
the international level (Gamarra 2003a, 18).
The MIP was founded under the leadership o f Felipe Quispe in 2000. An
indigenist party, that is, one that wants to reclaim Bolivia for its original, indigenous
inhabitants, Quispe’s MIP has called for the creation o f a worker/campesino-led
government (Gamarra 2002, 21). While gaining six seats in the National Congress after
2002, Quispe has actively and vociferously worked against the institutions and principles
o f representative democracy. Indeed, as his dream o f a government composed o f workers
and campesinos suggests, Quispe’s vision o f democracy is a manifestation o f the
corporatist notions upheld by the COB and the CSUTCB (of which Quispe is also the
leader). At one point, the MIP leader declared that he was only a part o f the lower house
so that he could work to destroy the system from the inside (Fundación Milenio 2004,

22).
Finally, a third political party to emerge from its Cochabambino stronghold in the
late 1990s was the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR). Headed by Manfred Reyes Villa,

28 In 1998, President Banzer implemented a US-induced coca eradication plan that wiped out nearly all the
coca fields in the Chapare. The effects o f the so-called Plan D ignidad were disastrous for the coca
growers, not only because it dramatically reduced the financial benefits o f coca cultivation, but also
because it seriously damaged the informal sectors that had developed alongside the country’s coca industry.
The effects o f Plan D ignidad also unintentionally transformed Morales and the MAS from a local
phenomenon into a national actor (Gamarra 2004).
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the NFR was transformed from a strong locally-based party29 to a nationally recognized
one during the 2002 presidential elections, in which Reyes was a serious contender.
While Reyes ultimately lost the presidency in 2002, he did join Sánchez de Lozada’s
mega-coalition in the latter part of its existence, only to drop out once more before the
President’s forced resignation in October 2003. As with the MAS and the MIP, the NFR
has been an active critic of the traditional political parties since that time and has called
for a general overhaul of the political and economic models adopted in 1985 (Mayorga,
F. 2003, 116).
Unlike Condepa and UCS, the MAS, MIP, and in some periods the NFR, strongly
opposed the traditional political party system. Yet, their popular appeal was very similar
to that o f Condepa and the UCS: it was based on clientelism and, in the case o f the MIP
and the MAS, corporatist notions of representation. Like Fernández, Reyes Villa
attracted many followers through his campaign o f obras visibles. Quispe channeled the
demands of the rural and labor sectors as the head of both the MIP and the CSUTCB.
Morales, who has conformed to the political system much more since his emergence as a
prominent political figure after Sánchez de Lozada’s fall, began his political ascent as
head o f the prominent coca sector (Mayorga, F. 2003, 117). In all three cases, their
primary linkages with society were either based on clientelist or corporatist appeals.
And, like UCS and Condepa, the parties each arose out o f perceived deficits in the
traditional political party system.

29 Reyes was the mayor o f Cochabamba - the third largest city in Bolivia after Santa Cruz and La Paz from 1993-2002.
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These new political parties were not the only actors to emerge In the 1990s as
direct or Indirect threats to the traditional political parties’ electoral and political
dominance. Beginning in 2000, other powerful, non-state forces materialized in response
to and as a result of the changing social landscape in the country. In particular, civil
society organizations and social movements emerged that began to directly challenge
policy decisions taken by the state. Defending the rights o f the poor urban and rural
sectors, indigenous peoples, local unions, and other community-based organizations,
these groups were able to represent sectors o f Bolivian society that felt largely
disconnected from the formal political process. They expressed their discontent primarily
by reviving the strategy o f blockades, protests, and hunger strikes that had in the past
been used with great success by the COB. This “politics o f the street” (Calderón 1982)
was in large part supported in Congress by the MAS and the MIP. Thus, in many ways,
the opposition employed a two-prong strategy for resisting the state and what was largely
perceived as its neoliberal and pro-American stance: “/o que no consigas en el
parlamento, se consigue en la calle” (Chávez, et al. 2004).
One of these groups formed in response to a sudden spike in the cost o f water in
the city o f Cochabamba. In 1998, the regional company that provided water to a majority
o f the homes in the city was privatized and turned over to the international consortium,
Aguas del Tunari. The Coordinadora del Agua y la Vida was formed as a response to
this privatization with the objective o f defending the right o f the city’s population to
water and other basic services (Garcia, et al. 2004, 626). Headed by Oscar Olivera, the
Coordinadora organized a series o f mobilizations, strikes, and even an informal
referendum condemning Aguas de Tunari after it had announced a 35% increase in the
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cost of water. By April 2000, the contract with Aguas del Tunari was retracted (Garcia,
et al. 2004, 629). The Guerra del Agua was successful, and the model used by the
Coordinadora was replicated by other groups during future conflicts in the country
(Interview A, 4 May 2005; Interview B, 6 May 2005).
Several examples of these conflicts materialized in the latter half o f 2000, just on
the heels o f the Guerra del Agua. In September, coca growers in the Chapare organized a
series o f road blockades, refusing to clear the highways until the government halted their
coca eradication strategy and their plans to construct a US-financed military base.
Around the same time, the increasingly active teachers unions organized a series o f
protests with both urban and rural teachers. They demanded a salary increase and the
modification o f different aspects of the administration’s education reform. The CSUTCB
also sparked a round of protests that led to violent confrontations between the group and
the Bolivian armed forces. As a result o f the conflict, more than a dozen campesinos
were killed (Gamarra 2002, 13-14).
Each o f these incidents reflected the growth o f a new set o f unified social forces
that was beginning to threaten the traditional political parties’ hold over political control.
As one interviewee noted (Interview A, 4 May 2005), whereas these social movements
were largely incapable o f resolving many o f the country’s social, political, and economic
problems, they were able to bring these issues to light, forcing the government to address
them. After 2000, this pattern of protest, negotiation, and conflict resolution was
continuously exploited by different organized sectors o f Bolivian society, because, as
many have noted (Gamarra 2002, Interview A, 4 May 2005), it was far more successful at
producing results than the severely inefficient political system.
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Thus, even though the COB had been dismantled by the NPE, the corporatist
tradition it represented lived on and began to manifest itself in new ways by the end of
the 1990s. The emergence of political parties like the MAS and the MIP and o f social
movements in defense o f the rights of cocaleros, teachers, and rural campesinos reflected
this revived tradition. The corporatist nature o f these groups starkly contrasted with the
representative nature o f the traditional political parties. Whereas the party leaders
advocated institutional changes for renewing democracy in Bolivia, the emerging social
leaders advocated the use of mechanisms o f direct participation (Calderón and Gamarra
2003, 15). Moreover, the new political parties and social movements appealed to the
poor urban and rural classes, underscoring the middle class-based nature o f the traditional
political parties’ patrimonial appeal. And the allure o f the new parties and movements
was growing: their successes in confronting the government through the Guerra del Agua
demonstrated that their popular support had become strong enough to banish a
multinational from the country.
In effect, by 2000, the strength of these new political actors was on par with that
o f the traditional political parties. The “dichotomy” (Gamarra 2002, 28) o f the two
groups in terms of political power led many to conclude that there existed, by the early
21st century, dos institucionalidades (two institutionalities, in English) in Bolivia: one, as
represented by the country’s formal political institutions and particularly the traditional
political parties and the other corresponding to the país profundo, or the non-state
political forces harkening back to the formerly organized urban and rural sectors
(Interview A, 4 May 2005; Gamarra 2002, 14). In many ways* the two institutionalities
in Bolivia represented a return to the struggle for political power that existed in the
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country prior to the transition to democracy. As In the 1960s and 1970s, the central
governing authority In Bolivia had been replaced by competing political factions, each
which their own contrasting definition of what representation should entail. The role of
the traditional political party system as the sole intermediary between state and society
was clearly under attack.
Conclusion
By 2000, then, it was evident that the linkages that the traditional political party
system maintained with society were threatened. The reasons for this were twofold. On
the one hand, the principle o f pacted democracy, while promoting political stability at
least in the short-term, effectively isolated the political party system from Bolivian
society. Executive-centric policy-making and implementation diminished the importance
of political parties and reduced their role to one o f job distribution and inter-party
bargaining. As such, the traditional political parties were hard-pressed to develop
linkages with society beyond that of clientelist-based neopatrimonialism. Historically
tied to the urban middle classes, the limitations of this party-society linkage began to
manifest by the end o f the 1990s in the wake o f the economic recession. As the number
o f jobless Bolivians grew, so too did the discontent toward the traditional political
parties. The emergence of new parties and social movements supports this contention.
Moreover, corporatist notions of representation dating back to the M NR’s dream
o f forging a single-party hegemonic democracy after the National Revolution had never
died away. The COB represented the notion throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While the
NPE was able to abolish the Central in 1985, the political parties, constrained as they
were by the limited extent o f patrimonialism, were unable to capture the support o f the
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disenfranchised laborers. By the end of the 1990s, new social movements and political
parties entered onto the political scene, reviving the corporatist tradition and reconnecting
with the poor urban and rural classes that had been disenfranchised after the dismantling
o f the COB. Their accomplishments both in the streets and at the ballot box imply that
many Bolivians still responded to these kinds of linkages. Thus, the political parties were
not only incapacitated by the weaknesses o f pacted democracy. They were also
debilitated by the renewed calls for corporatism by the newly politicized poor urban and
rural sectors.
As a result, by 2000, the clientelist-based linkages that the traditional political
parties were able to sustain with society were being tested by growing domestic pressures
for change. The economic recession, changing social dynamics, and successful non-state
political mobilizations threatened the dominance o f the traditional political party system.
Its weak, or what one interviewee has called “thin,” linkages with society were
vulnerable to the convergence of economic, political, and social change in the country
(Interview A, 4 May 2005). By the beginning of the 21st century, it became increasingly
apparent that the party system was in danger o f decline. Chapter Four argues that the
traditional political party system did enter into decline after 2000 and looks at the specific
manifestations o f this decline, both prior to the political crisis o f 2003 and after Sánchez
de Lozada’s forced resignation.
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IV.

ANALYZING PARTY SYSTEM DECLINE
Chapter Three examined the conditions of economic crisis and social change in

Bolivia by the end of the 1990s, setting the stage for traditional political party system
decline. The purpose of this chapter is to make the case that the traditional party system
actually entered into decline after 2000 and examines how that decline has been
expressed since then. To do this, it focuses on four different manifestations o f the
erosion o f the clientelist-based party-society linkages in Bolivia.
The first section looks at the electoral expressions o f the traditional party system
decline. It notes a gradual decline in voter abstention and an increase in electoral
volatility by the end of the decade. The 2002 presidential elections are a further
indication o f the discontent toward the traditional political parties: while the MNR was
able to win the presidency, its win was by the narrowest o f margins. Overall, the loss in
voter share o f the three traditional political parties in 2002 was profound. Moreover, the
legislative shake-up after the elections produced a Congress that was bitterly divided
along traditional-new political party lines, complicating executive-legislative relations
and weakening the traditional political parties vis-a-vis the opposition in Parliament.
Bolivian opinion on the traditional political parties between 1998 and 2004
represents the second manifestation of the decline o f the party system. The second
section o f the chapter analyzes the wealth o f information produced by two sets o f surveys
and focus groups carried out in Bolivia between 1998 and 2004. Notably, confidence in
political parties, and the traditional political parties in general, was low in 1998 and had
decreased even further by 2004. Four years into the 21st century, most Bolivians felt that
political parties were not necessary for democracy, nor was the principle o f pacted
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democracy that underscored their democratic regime. Finally, Bolivians reserved their
most negative opinions for the traditional political parties. Whereas some o f the newer
political parties, including the MAS, were viewed in a more positive light, by 2004, it
was clear that the traditional political parties had lost the confidence of society. These
expressions of discontent serve as another indicator o f the decline o f the traditional
political party system.
The third section delves briefly into a new phenomenon that has emerged since
Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation in 2003. Specifically, it looks at the surfacing o f
“anti-party” policies after his downfall, including the use o f referenda for important
policymaking decisions, the call for a Constituent Assembly, and a law that allows non
political party candidates to run for office. The presumption underlying this section is
that such policies would not have been passed if not for the overwhelming rejection of
the traditional political parties after 2000. The erosion o f the linkages between the
traditional parties and society was reflected in the replacement o f those political parties
with other electoral and policymaking alternatives.
Finally, given the “anti-party” political context after the fall o f Sánchez de
Lozada, the last section examines the results from the first electoral race to take place
after the political crisis o f that year. As might be expected, the traditional political parties
fared very poorly in the December 2004 municipal elections. On the other hand, new
political parties, and particularly the MAS, were much more successful at the local level.
This last section, then, looks at the decline o f the traditional political party system while
also highlighting the possible transformation o f party politics from a system centered on
the three traditional political parties to one that comprises the newer political parties.
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Examining the Electoral Evidence o f Party System Decline
Some scholars have argued that the first two signs of dealignment in a country are
electoral volatility and voter abstention (Hagopian 1998). These electoral trends indicate
the “rising tide o f citizen disinterest, disillusion, and disaffection” toward their political
parties and the political system in general (Hagopian 1998, 118). They are, in essence,
good snapshot measures of the state of the linkages between political parties and society.
In the case of Bolivia, because the political system was ruled by the alternation o f power
between the MNR, MIR, and ADN, any surge in electoral volatility or decline in voter
abstention after 1985 can be attributed in large part to the “disinterest, disillusion, and
disaffection” towards these three traditional political parties. This assumption underlies
the analysis to follow.
Voter abstention intensified by the end of the 1990s and particularly during the
2002 presidential elections. The percentage o f registered voters who abstained from
voting grew consistently during the decade. In 1993, 18.34% o f registered voters
abstained. By 1997, this figure had risen to 22.46%, and in the presidential elections of
2002, the abstention percentage topped out at 24.8% (Mayorga, R. 2002, 96).30 Electoral
volatility also increased between the 1997 and 2002 elections, although it had been high
since the second democratic election in 1985. While the volatility level31 was 46.19 after
the 1997 election, it rose to 50.27 in 2002 (Political Database o f the Americas, 1999,
2000a, 2000b), suggesting a rather dramatic shift in voter shares between the two
30 These figures represent the total number o f registered voters who abstained as a percentage o f the total
population who is eligible to vote (that is, over 18 years o f age) but is not necessarily registered to vote.
31 The volatility levels are according to the Pedersen’s Index. For each o f the three elections (1993, 1997,
2002), the top eight voter share percentages were used. The author compiled the data and determined the
volatility level using the Political Database o f the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002).

79

elections. Indeed, a closer look at the 2002 national election is merited, as the high
electoral volatility represented primarily a turn from the traditional political parties to
three newer parties, the MAS, the NFR, and the MIP.
The traditional political parties did not fare well in the 2002 national election,
particularly in comparison with past years. Prior to 2002, the three traditional political
parties taken together captured the majority of the votes in each election. Table 4.1 in
Appendix 2 compares the voter share, as a percentage o f total votes, o f the MNR, ADN,
and MIR (labeled “Traditional”) in each national election since 1989 with the voter share
o f the next three top placers in each election (labeled “Next Three”). In 1989, for
example, the MNR, ADN, and MIR together won 65.41% o f the total popular vote,
whereas the three parties that placed fourth, fifth, and sixth in terms o f voter share, in this
case, Condepa, Izquierda Unida (IU), and Partido Socialista-1 (PS-1), captured only
20.76%. By 2002, the three traditional political parties together received only 42.16% of
the voter share and were no longer the top three finishers. The MAS, MIP, and the NFR,
on the other hand, received 47.94% of the vote. For the first time, three non-traditional
political parties captured a larger percentage o f the voter share than the traditional parties.
The impact of this shift in voter shares was dramatic. For one, the ADN virtually
disappeared from the national stage, and the MIR finished in fourth place behind two new
political parties, the NFR and the MAS, as well as the MNR. For its part, the MNR
managed to receive the highest number o f votes, but it did so with only a very slight
plurality.32 New political parties, on the other hand, did surprisingly well: the MAS

32 On June 30, 2002, official first round election results, as taken from the Comité Nacional Electoral of
Bolivia, were the following at the national level: MNR, 22.46%; MAS, 20.94%; NFR, 20.91%; MIR,
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placed a close second behind the MNR, the NFR received the third highest percentage of
votes, and the MIP ended in fifth place after the MIR. The 2002 results suggest, at least
electorally speaking, that the traditional political parties no longer dominated the political
system as they had for the past fifteen years,33
The MAS and the MIP were two of the clear winners in 2002; together they
accounted for almost 30% of the Congress, giving them the power to veto when voting as
a bloc. In particular, the MIP won five seats in the lower house, and the MAS won
thirteen. Beyond their electoral triumph, the symbolic victory o f the MAS and the MIP
was also important. Representing in many ways the demands of the social movements
that had dominated the streets after 2000, their congressional victory meant that, for the
first time, these informal political forces would have an institutional voice in government.
The political society in Bolivia, as defined by the three traditional political parties, had
converged with the country’s proactive civil society in the Congress (Mayorga, F. 2002,
141). Despite this unprecedented opportunity for cross-party collaboration, however, the
Congress split down traditional/new party lines. The MNR formed an uneasy pact with
the MIR and UCS, and the NFR, MAS, and MIP would serve as a forceful and dominant
opposition in the legislature.
Indeed, the antagonistic nature of President Sánchez de Lozada’s Pacto Plan
Bolivia cannot be overstated. The hostile relationship between the MNR and the MIR
16.31%; MIP, 6.09%; UCS, 5.51%; ADN, 3.39%; LyJ, 2.72%; PS, 0.65%; MCC, 0.63%; CONDEPA,
0.37%.
33 Another author has taken a different spin on the 2002 national elections. Considering the poor electoral
results o f the MNR, MIR, and ADN, he argues that traditional political party system was in fact quite
resilient after 2002. By forming an alliance between the MNR and the MIR, the principle o f coalitions was
preserved; the party system converted from a tripod o f three parties to a vertical column consisting o f two
(Mayorga, R. 2002, 78). This study suggests that his analysis is overly optimistic given the polarized nature
o f politics that resulted from the MNR-MIR alliance, the character o f which is discussed below.
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distracted the coalition from dealing with the growing economic and social problems in
the country. Moreover, it exacerbated the patronage-driven nature o f the pact: the two
principal parties fought for every Ministry, Embassy, and any other governmental job
available. Some argued that it was more patronage-based than any other coalition before
it (Gamarra 2003b, 290). Although the hegemony o f the traditional political parties
prevailed, then, past guarantees of govemability and political stability were no longer
assured. A vociferous, opposition-led Congress fostered this instability.
The shift in votes from the traditional to the new political parties in the 2002
national election reflected a dealignment o f the traditional parties with society. An
increase in voter abstention, which had reached its height in 2002, along with the high
electoral volatility compared to 1997, support this contention. Moreover, even though
the MNR and the MIR managed to form a Congressional coalition in which traditional
political party control was maintained, the antagonistic and tenuous nature o f the pact
reflected the extent to which their dominance had been debilitated. As one author argues,
it appeared, in 2002, that pacted democracy had “run its course” (Gamarra 2003b, 290).
Assessing Bolivian Opinion on the Traditional Political Party System
It could be argued that the 2002 presidential election results were an electoral
anomaly and a short-term reaction to the aggravated economic and social context in
which they were carried out. Other indicators measured from 1998 on, however, suggest
that the relative losses o f the MNR, ADN, and MIR were instead a manifestation o f an
intensified discontent toward the traditional political parties, the Congress, and even the
President during that time. In particular, by 2004, Bolivian opinion towards the
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traditional political parties and the political system in general had dropped to very low
levels. The following pages look at different expressions o f this discontent.
Most of the survey data below refer to “political parties” as a group and not
specifically to the three traditional political parties (MNR, MIR, ADN) that are the focus
o f this study. That said, an assumption of the proceeding analysis is that most o f the
discontent measured in the surveys was directed in particular to the three traditional
political parties. There are two reasons for this. One, as the study has already
demonstrated, the three traditional political parties dominated the party system from 1985
on. Thus, most o f the anger toward the party system was in fact directed to these three
parties and not to “political parties” as a group. The unexpected electoral success o f the
new political parties, including the MAS and the MIP, in 2002 and 2004 (to be discussed
below), support this contention.
Moreover, most of the anti-party discourse elaborated by the social movements
and new political parties after 1998 was directed explicitly at these three parties. Thus, it
seems reasonable to expect that the traditional political parties would have been conflated
with the political party system in general within these surveys, although there is no
evidence that definitively supports this supposition. Nevertheless, the last part o f this
section is dedicated to survey results (Appendix 4, Table 4.6) that actually differentiate
between the confidence levels of different political parties. The lowest levels are
reserved for the three traditional political parties - a fact that supports the assumption that
underlies the following pages.
Between 1998 and 2004, then, a representative sample o f Bolivians was asked to
respond to a series o f questions about different political institutions in the country. The
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group had to specify how much confidence they had in political parties, Congress, the
President, and the municipal government, among others. Given a scale o f 1 to 7, the
respondents would choose 1 if they had no confidence at all in the institution and 7 if
they had a lot of confidence. Appendix 3 provides the results for each o f the questions in
the four survey periods. In the four tables, the black bar represents an aggregate of the
two lowest ratings, that is, the sum of the percentage o f respondents who had no
confidence in each institution (a rating of 1) and the percentage o f respondents who gave
2 as their answer on the 1 to 7 scale. Accordingly, the white bar is an aggregate o f the
percentage o f respondents who gave the two highest ratings possible on the seven-point
scale.
As expected, the overall confidence is lowest and the most pronounced in the case
of the political parties. Notably, the highest confidence towards political parties
accounted for only 5.7% o f the total respondents surveyed in 2002. This jump from the
much lower “highest” ratings in 1998, 2000, and 2004 may be a result o f the presidential
elections o f that year. While highly unpopular, Sánchez de Lozada did represent a
change from the Banzer/Quiroga administration, whose popularity had suffered greatly
after the Guerra del Agua and throughout the rest of their term, when the number of
protests, blockades, and governmental stand-offs escalated in the country.
Overall, however, the political parties fared poorly in each o f the four survey
periods. At their best, in 1998, the percentage o f respondents who had the lowest levels
o f confidence in the political parties was just under 50% o f the total population sample.
The most pronounced differences in levels o f confidence were recorded in 2000 and
2004, when the “lowest” percentage reached almost 60% o f the sample. In general, the
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differences between the highest and lowest levels of confidence towards the political
parties increased between 1998 and 2004, although these increases were not uniform.
The 2000 sample is notable because it registered a spike in the lowest confidence
ratings for three o f the four institutions listed: political parties, the President, and the
Congress, although to a lesser degree. This suggests that the effects o f the economic
recession and growing social unrest after 1998 were exacerbating the already poor
confidence levels of each o f these institutions. As such, these results contradict the
argument that the 2002 elections were simply an anomaly. Discontent, as registered in
terms of voter abstention, electoral volatility, and low levels o f institutional confidence,
had existed in the years prior to the presidential elections in 2002.
What is perhaps most surprising from the 2000 data set is that the municipal
governments did not register a similar spike in lowest confidence ratings as the other
institutions. Instead, the difference between the highest and lowest confidence ratings
stayed almost constant during the seven years o f the survey set, suggesting that, while the
municipalities did not earn greater levels o f trust among Bolivians, they did not lose their
confidence either. The relative stability o f confidence levels for municipal governments
with respect to political parties, Congress, and the President, suggest that Bolivians may
be more satisfied with governance at the local versus the national level.
Admittedly, the time period covered in these tables is rather short. Data on
attitudes towards the political parties in Bolivia prior to 1998 would have strengthened
the conclusions drawn here about their progressive decline during subsequent years,
when data was available. The tables do, however, provide an initial glimpse o f the
confidence among Bolivians towards their institutions during the height o f the era o f
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pacted democracy and before the political party system began to decline. Indeed, in
1998, the economic and social impact of the recession had yet to be felt in its entirety.
Still, as expected, two years later the recession’s effects had exacerbated the low levels of
confidence of many Bolivians towards their political institutions, especially at the
national level
In 2004, Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE in Spanish) carried out another
round o f surveys and focus groups in an attempt to capture Bolivians’ attitudes towards
political parties, other political actors, and with regards to democracy in general, just one
year after the 2003 political crisis and Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation. The
initial results from this project provide additional support to the argument that the
political party system is in a state of decline. Appendix 4 contains a series o f different
tables indicating the opinion of Bolivians on the importance o f political parties and other
political institutions. As the following analysis suggests, attitudes towards political
parties and the political party system in 2004 were decisively low.
Table 4.2, for example, represents the responses given to the question of whether
political parties are necessary for democracy. As the results indicate, almost 81% o f the
respondents felt that political parties are considered only somewhat or not at all necessary
for democracy in the country. Indeed, whereas only 15.4% o f those surveyed believed
that parties were very necessary for democracy, 24.3% thought that they were not at all
necessary. The most common response for this question was that political parties were
only somewhat necessary for democracy. This attitude clearly contradicts the theoretical
notion that political parties are fundamental for representative democracy. It also implies

86

that, while democracy is still supported in the country, the political party system in
Bolivia is no longer considered an important aspect o f that regime.
It was not just the political parties that were no longer considered fundamental for
democracy in Bolivia. The principle of pacted democracy that has sustained the party
system since 1985 was also questioned by the respondents in the 2004 survey. As Table
4.3 indicates, most Bolivians do not believe that party alliances are valuable. O f those
surveyed, 76.4 percent felt that there were better forms o f government that did not rely
upon Congressional pacts. Only 16 percent felt that the parties should continue to form
alliances in Parliament, suggesting that the notion of pacted democracy, at least in terms
o f Bolivian opinion, had, in fact, “run its course.”
The CNE 2004 survey also asked Bolivians to evaluate a list o f nineteen different
institutions in terms of their contributions to democracy; how well they work; if they are
trustworthy; if they are corrupt; or whether they should be eliminated altogether, if given
the choice. From this set of five questions, the CNE developed two measures that
ordered the nineteen institutions in terms o f how positively or how negatively they were
perceived.34 The results from this question set are important because, unlike the Seligson
data above, they include not only the confidence level o f each institution, but they also
evaluate how well the institution is perceived to be working and how much it has
contributed to democracy (CNE 2004, 76). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the results for the
two measures. The institutions with the most positive image, as denoted in Table 4.4,
34 In the survey, respondents were asked to identify, from the list o f nineteen institutions plus an option for
none o f the above, which o f the set o f institutions they perceived as (1) contributing the most to democracy;
(2) working the best; (3) the most corrupt; (4) having the most confidence; and (5) worthy o f elimination.
The first, second, and fourth options contributed to the positive image o f an institution. The third and fifth
options contributed to its overall negative image. The scores for each institution were then tallied.
Percentages were determined according to those results and based on a total o f 300 percentage points.
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include the Catholic Church, the mayors, the Ombudsman, the press, and Civic
Committees. Notably, political parties only score above the Armed Forces and
transnational companies in terms of their positive image.
As with the Seligson data on institutional confidence between 1998 and 2004,
Table 4,5 indicates that the political parties have by far the most negative image o f all
nineteen institutions. Parliament comes in a distant second. In general, most o f the
national political institutions, that is, political parties, Parliament, government, as well as
the police and the Armed Forces, maintain a very low positive image, particularly in
comparison with local or community-based institutions. Civic committees, the Mayor,
and neighborhood juntas, on the other hand, receive a relatively high ranking in terms of
their positive image. Here, as with the Seligson data, there is a difference in the
assessment o f the work and democratic contributions of local level political and
community-based institutions versus their national counterparts. It appears that Bolivians
are, in general, more satisfied with their local institutions than they are with those at the
national level.
It is important to make a distinction between the traditional political parties o f the
country’s party system from the new political parties that emerged during and after the
1990s. Another aspect o f the survey suggests that Bolivians have differing opinions
about the traditional versus the newer political parties. Given a list o f eight different
political parties, those surveyed had to state whether they had a favorable or unfavorable
opinion o f each. Table 4.6 indicates the responses for the MNR, MIR, MAS, Movimiento
sin Miedo (MSM), ADN, UCS, MIP, NFR, and Unidad Nacional (UN). The results
listed represent the subtraction of the percentage who responded unfavorably to those
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who responded favorably. As the table demonstrates, all of the political parties have an
unfavorable image. Three of the least favorable percentages, however, can be attributed
to the three traditional political parties: the MIR has an aggregate image o f -65%; the
MNR, -66%; and the ADN, -76%. The MIP and the UCS also have comparably low
ratings, reflecting the polarizing nature of the former (as well as its limited electoral reach
over the long term) and the ephemerality o f the latter, particularly after the death o f its
leader.
Notably, the parties that register the most favorable image relative to the
traditional political parties are all new, having only emerged in the past five to ten years.
The MAS clearly fares best, with a -30% overall rating. Morales’ political party, along
with the UN and the MSM,35 each received an overall negative rating that was under 50
percent. These numbers lend additional support to the possibility that the 2002
presidential election results were not just an anomaly. The image o f the traditional
political parties is very low, particularly in comparison with other political parties. In
2002, their unfavorable image was reflected in their unusually low share o f the total
votes; in 2004, this attitude has clearly been sustained. On the other hand, the newer
parties have a much more favorable image, suggesting that may serve as a more attractive
electoral option in the future.

35 The Frente Unidad Nacional (UN) is a political party founded in Cochabamba on December 12,2003,
by a former M IR member, Samuel Doria Medina. Doria was subsequently elected as the head o f the party
on April 4, 2004 (Fundación Milenio 2004, 23). A successful businessman and one o f the richest people in
Bolivia, D oria’s reputation as a political outsider has helped him to become a strong contender for the 2007
presidential elections. Movimiento sin Miedo (MSM) was founded in 1999 by another former MIR
member, lu ae del Granado. Currently the reelected mayor o f La Paz, the party is strongest in this political
capital. Like Condepa or the UCS o f the 1990s, the MSM has been successful because o f del Granado’s
ability to carry out obras visibles in the city (Gamarra 2005, 13). Del Granado’s potential presidential
candidacy may be hampered by the party’s inability to extend its electoral reach beyond the department o f
La Paz.
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Overall, the results from the CNE survey indicate that most Bolivians were
disillusioned and unhappy with the traditional political parties and the party system in
2004, While none of the political parties were perceived in an overly positive light, the
traditional political parties were the most maligned o f all. Moreover, a majority no
longer believed that political parties or their coalitions were necessary for democracy. As
such, the CNE survey results lends support to the contention that the weak links that the
traditional political parties once had society were eroded, particularly in the year
following the 2003 political crisis.
Anti-Party Politics after 2003
Another aspect of the decline of the traditional political parties was the
conspicuous absence of those parties in terms o f the promises made and the laws
implemented since the fall of Sánchez de Lozada. Indeed, the new, ‘partyless’ president,
Carlos Mesa Gilbert, assumed office without the formal backing o f any political party,
promising to dedicate his term to the fulfillment o f three lofty objectives: to carry out a
binding referendum on the exportation o f the country’s hydrocarbons; to modify the
existing Hydrocarbons Law according to the referendum; and to organize a Constituent
Assembly to reform Bolivia’s constitution. The goals of his “October Agenda,” along
with a law passed in 2004 that allows other citizen and indigenous groups to put forth
candidates for election alongside political parties, represented a new trend in policy
making after the 2003 political crisis. They reflected a move away from party-based
governance and the traditional political party system that had been central to
representative democracy in country since 1985.
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One fundamental element of Mesa’s “October Agenda” was his pledge to
organize a referendum on the Hydrocarbons Law. This referendum, which was carried
out on July 18, 2004, bypassed the political parties in Congress and brought the issue o f if
and how to export Bolivia’s natural gas reserves directly to Bolivians for them to decide.
In essence, the referendum was promoted and even celebrated as a mechanism of direct
citizen participation. The information drive carried out by the government prior to its
realization heralded the referendum as an expression o f direct democracy.36 Mesa’s
campaign worked. Each of the five points of the referendum was eventually approved,
although as o f the time o f writing an interpretation o f the referendum results had yet to be
formulated that could be successfully translated into law.37
The other important goal of Mesa’s agenda was the organization o f a Constituent
Assembly. Calls for sweeping constitutional reform had been made continuously by
many different groups, including the MAS, the CSUTCB, the Coordinadora del Agua,
the teachers’ unions, and student movements, since the politically tumultuous year o f
2000. As the discontent toward the political party system grew after that time, so too did
the calls for a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly, while not explicitly undermining
the role o f political parties as in the case o f the hydrocarbons referendum, did threaten to
undermine their dominance. Indeed, many supporters o f the Assembly called for the
36 The author was in La Paz and Cochabamba in June 2004, only a few weeks prior to the referendum vote.
Propaganda about the vote, in the form o f pamphlets, posters, and even street-wide banners in both cities
marketed the referendum to citizens by portraying it as a mechanism o f “democracia directa” ,
37 The length o f each o f the five questions, as well as their highly technical nature, has led the many critics
o f the referendum to conclude that, even though the referendum was overwhelmingly approved, the content
o f each question is so ambiguous that different sectors have entirely different interpretations o f what that
approval means. As a result, by June 2005 the language o f the new Hydrocarbons Law had not yet been
approved in both houses o f Congress and by the President, In early May 2005, Congress was able to agree
upon a draft Law. Ultimately, however, Mesa demurred from rejecting or passing the Law, and it was sent
back to Congress for further consideration.
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abolishment of the traditional political parties as a condition of its organization (Gamarra
2002, 13).
In early July 2004, just weeks before the hydrocarbons referendum, another piece
o f important legislation passed that altered the electoral landscape and the notion of
representation in Bolivia. The Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas
(henceforth referred to as the Ley) allowed citizens to run for office outside o f political
party structures through agrupaciones ciudadanas (citizen groups) or pueblos indígenas
(indigenous groups). The goals of the Ley included the ureconfiguración del sistema
político y la puesta en escena de nuevos mecanismos de representación popular” (Rocha
2004). In essence, the Ley was passed as a mechanism to eliminate the monopoly o f the
political parties as the sole channel of representation o f citizens in government. Mesa
him self proclaimed that the Ley represented Aparte del camino hacia la participación de
la ciudadanía” (Los Tiempos 8 July 2004). The Ley provided an innovative way for
citizens to participate in politics without having to go through political party structures.
The hydrocarbons referendum, the proposed Constituent Assembly, and the Ley
de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas were each promoted by the Mesa
administration as opportunities for the direct participation o f citizens in the democratic
process. In each case, the hegemonic nature o f the traditional political party system was
directly or indirectly jeopardized. The referendum took the policy-making process from
Congress and gave it to the population at large. The Ley allowed for non-party
candidates to compete with political party members for elected positions. The
Constituent Assembly threatened to change the nature o f the political system completely.
The desire among many Bolivians for each o f these acts, and the willingness o f the Mesa
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administration to attempt to carry them out, were another reflection o f the traditional
political party system’s decline in the country.
Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that, if the traditional political parties had not
become dealigned with society, citizen demands to essentially replace them with citizen
or indigenous groups or to bypass them altogether with policymaking referenda would
not have materialized. Unhappy with the traditional political parties’ political
performance between 1985 and 2003, Bolivians sought and supported legislation after
that period that promoted new forms of participation and representation. As with the
growing voter abstention rates and electoral volatility in 2002 and the survey results
between 1998 and 2004 by both Seligson and the CNE, the post-2003 political
developments in Bolivia reflected the severe nature o f the dealignment and decline o f the
country’s traditional political party system.
Assessing the Post-Political Crisis Vote
It is important to mention one more event in Bolivia, because in many ways it
represented the culmination o f the decline o f the political party system after 2000 and
since Sánchez de Lozada’s downfall. On December 5, 2004, municipal elections were
held in the country. These elections marked the first instance in which the Ley was put
into practice and thus the first instance in which non-party candidates could compete with
political parties for Municipal Council positions and the mayor’s seat. On that day, 345
citizen groups, 59 indigenous groups, 17 political parties, and 2 political alliances were
on the ballot. The results from the municipal elections are illuminating. Whereas the
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indigenous and citizen groups fared quite poorly,38 the new political parties, and the MAS
in particular, were the clear electoral winners. The MAS obtained 453 council seats
nationwide; its closest competitor was the MNR with 196 council seats. Despite its
second place finish, the MNR, along with the MIR and the ADN, did not do well
comparatively. Together the three parties garnered a mere 16.29 percent o f the total vote
share. The MNR essentially disappeared from the urban centers, and the ADN captured
only 2.55 percent of the total number of votes (Gamarra 2005, 12).
On the other hand, the new political parties were as successful if not more so than
the three traditional political parties. The MAS, as mentioned above, won the most
council seats, although it did not win any mayoral seats in Bolivia’s ten principle urban
centers.

39

It also demonstrated the broadest national voter spread o f any political party or

citizen group. Other new parties, however, also did quite well. The MSM, Plan
Progreso (PP), and the UN each received between five and ten percent o f the total vote
share (8.74%, 6.58%, and 5.89% respectively), which, when taken together, exceeds the
total percentage of votes of the traditional political parties. As one author noted, the
success o f these leaders reflected a conservative calculation on the part o f voters to
reward those mayors who had performed obras visibles in the past (Gamarra 2005, 13).

38 In fact, some indigenous groups were successful at gaining council seats and in a few cases the M ayor’s
position in small rural municipalities. While citizens groups won council seats and a few key Mayoral
positions in the urban centers, in most cases these groups provided little more than organizational support
to former political party members that had abandoned their party in the hopes of finding electoral victory
on their own. See the National Electoral Court’s web site for the official results from the elections:
http://www.cne.org.bo.
39 That is, the nine departmental capitals - Cobija, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz, Sucre,
Tarija, Trinidad - and El Alto. While not obtaining any mayoral seats, the MAS did win council seats in
seven o f the ten principle cities, including four in Cochabamba, three in La Paz, two in El Alto, and one
council seat each in Sucre, Oruro, Santa Cruz, and Tarija.
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These newer political parties met their citizens’ demands and were subsequently
rewarded for their work.
Overall, the results from the 2004 Municipal Elections are noteworthy for two
reasons. On the one hand, they reflect a further decline of the traditional political party
system in both principle and practice. The presence o f a large quantity o f indigenous and
citizen groups implied that many Bolivians sought representation (albeit for the most part
unsuccessfully) through groups other than political parties. In practice, they
demonstrated that new political parties were preferred over the traditional ones, at least at
the local level. Moreover, the elections demonstrated that Bolivians could and did
differentiate between the traditional and new political parties. Indeed, while the
traditional political party system fared poorly in the Municipal Elections, the rejection of
political parties in general was not at all evident. These findings support the CNE 2004
Survey results, which indicated that the new political parties had a far less negative image
in comparison with their traditional counterparts.
Thus, it is important to discriminate between the decline o f the traditional political
party system and the endurance of the notion o f political parties in general in Bolivia.
That is, despite post-2003 trends in the country towards downplaying the role o f political
parties, it is clear that most Bolivians recognize that, at least at the local level, certain
political parties and their leaders have been successful in meeting the needs o f their
constituents. The traditional political party system, on the other hand, has clearly been in
a state o f decline since 2000. The results from the 2004 Municipal Elections support this
assessment. While the traditional political parties have not dropped out entirely from the

95

local or national electoral scene in Bolivia, it is clear that they are no longer in control of
the country’s political system, as they once were.
Conclusion
The case of Bolivia supports Roberts’ contention that a political party system is in
decline when it becomes detached from its social moorings. After 2000, the dealignment
and hence decline o f the traditional political party system in Bolivia materialized in four
different ways: electorally, through the opinions o f Bolivians, with the surge in “anti
party” initiatives, and in the 2004 Municipal Elections. In each instance, the detachment
o f the traditional political parties from society, as well as the discontent o f Bolivians
towards those parties, was evident.
Specifically, survey results from 1998 on suggest that this discontent toward the
traditional political party system had been strong since the end of the 1990s. By 2004,
neither the traditional parties nor the principle of pacted democracy had the support of
most Bolivians. Moreover, after the forced resignation o f Sánchez de Lozada, the surge
in “anti-party” policy initiatives reflected a shift in societal demands to more direct forms
o f democratic participation. The use of referenda and the adoption o f a law that allowed
non-party candidates to run for office are examples of this. Unhappy with the traditional
political parties, many different sectors began to search for new forms o f representation
in the country.
The most pronounced evidence o f this search for new forms o f representation was
manifested in the shifts in voter shares both in the 2002 and 2004 elections. In 2002,
more Bolivians supported non-traditional political parties than ever before, and the
legislative shake-up that ensued fostered a weak traditional party-led ruling coalition
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against a strong Congressional opposition. The 2004 Municipal Elections suggest that
new linkages with society may be materializing with the new political parties, including,
in particular, the MAS. In both instances, the new political parties emerged as the
preferred electoral option for many Bolivians.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the 2002 and 2004 election results demonstrated
that the clientelist-based patrimonial linkages fostered by the traditional political parties
were no longer sufficient to capture votes either at the local or national level, reflecting
those parties’ inability to adapt to shifting societal demands, as represented by the newly
politicized urban poor and rural classes. The new political parties, on the other hand,
were successful in appealing to these sectors along more corporatist lines. This shift in
voter shares, along with the negative Bolivian opinion towards the traditional political
parties and the emergence o f “anti-party” initiatives after 2003, reflected the limitations
o f the ties that bonded the traditional parties to society. The middle class focus o f their
patrimonial-based linkages would prove insufficient as the urban poor and rural classes
began to articulate their demands by the end of the 1990s.
Thus, it seems clear that the traditional political party system in Bolivia entered in
decline after the turn o f the millennium, as the preceding pages have demonstrated. Yet,
it is important to distinguish between party system decline and party system decay in the
Bolivian case. Although the traditional political party system has become dealigned with
society, it is still too early to conclude that political parties are no longer capable of
establishing new linkages with society. The next few years in Bolivia, then, will be
fundamental for the fate o f the country’s political party system. They will ultimately
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determine whether the country’s traditional political parties are able to forge new
connections with society or whether they will fall into eventual decay.
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¥.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

“Un pensador italiano decía: 'lo viejo se resiste a morir y lo nuevo no ha nacido
una transición dificiF - José Ortiz Mercado (El Nuevo Día, 1 June 2003).

[En Bolivia,] estamos en

In 1985» the leaders o f the MNR and the ADN sat down together in an effort to
address the political instability and economic crisis that had plagued the country since the
tortuous transition to democracy began in the late 1970s. Because o f their meeting, the
country’s political system would be dramatically changed. As the preceding analysis has
demonstrated, the principle o f pacted democracy and the NPE would bring both stability
and instability to Bolivia. Relief from the economic crisis and the recentralization of
power into the state allowed the ruling coalitions to govern, shepherding in a decade of
economic, political, and social reforms.
The political system adopted in 1985 proved to be a doubled-edge sword,
however. For, whereas the NPE was successful in dismantling the COB and hence
diminishing their corporatist-based bonds with different sectors o f society, the traditional
political party system, constrained by the limitations o f pacted democracy, was ultimately
unable to capture the support of these sectors. The clientelist-based patrimonial linkages
they did maintain with society were too weak and too narrow to appease or encapsulate
the growing needs o f the population, particularly by the end o f the 1990s. Nevertheless,
the traditional political party system endured at the base o f the country’s hegemonic
center for more than five presidential terms, sustained by the promise and potential of
their innovative reforms.
As Roberts theorized, with the arrival o f an economic recession in 1998 and with
it a period o f profound social change, the linkages between the traditional political parties
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and society began to erode. The subsequent evidence o f party system decline was
manifested in myriad ways: at the ballot box, with the post-2003 “anti-party” political
initiatives, and as represented through the opinions and perspectives o f Bolivians
themselves. By the middle of 2005, it was apparent that the traditional political party
system was in a period of extended decline. They no longer had control o f the political
and economic system that they had helped to create.
Given Bolivia’s political history, as examined in Chapter Two, it is perhaps not
surprising that the traditional political parties were unable to forge stronger linkages with
society. After all, political parties and the political party system are relatively alien
concepts for Bolivians. Accustomed to corporatist notions o f political organization, the
arrival o f political parties as the sole mediator between state and society was something
new in Bolivian politics. Historically speaking, political parties were unable to serve this
primary intermediating role in the country, particularly with respect to the COB and the
military. As a result, since 1985, the conceptual difference between political parties and
social movements was never really articulated. The MAS is an example o f the
ambiguous roles o f political actors in the modern-day representative system. Neither
entirely political party nor social movement, the MAS has been able to exploit both roles
depending on the circumstances. Notably, the MAS is considered the most popular and
most powerful political party in the country today.
Thus, despite the remarkable accomplishments o f pacted democracy and the NPE,
Bolivia’s present-day political system has retained many political behaviors that
contradict the notion of representative democracy. After 2000, the atomization o f power
and loss o f centralized political control, along with the ongoing economic crisis,
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essentially reflected a revival of the country’s politically charged past. Roberts would
argue that this tumultuous period represents the critical moment in which the country’s
traditional political parties must adapt to the shifting societal demands in an effort to
realign itself with society and recover their position as the sole channel o f mediation
between state and society. Given the climate o f political instability and insecurity in
Bolivia, the conditions for party-society realignment seem less than optimal. Yet, the
foundation o f a political party system based on new linkages with society is not
impossible.
Indeed, the question to ask in the coming months and years is not i f the Bolivian
political party system will be able to forge new linkages with society. Rather, the
pending issues are which linkages should be formed in Bolivia and how those linkages
will be established so that they can endure in the long term. With these questions in
mind, this study raises two issues that can contribute to Roberts’ theory on party-society
linkages. Regarding the question of which party-society linkages to establish, Roberts
makes no normative claims about the five types o f linkages that he identifies as
connecting different Latin American political party systems with their respective
societies. Clientelism is no “better” and no “worse” than marketing or corporatist-based
linkages in his framework. Instead, Roberts’ analysis focuses on the particular historical
context in which the different linkages tend to emerge and decline.
Yet, the Bolivian case examined here suggests that the clientelist-based
neopatrimonial linkages that connected the traditional political parties with society were
not sufficient for accommodating the growing demands o f the newly mobilized urban
poor and rural sectors. The highly limited and weak nature o f clientelism in Bolivia
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indicates that this linkage is ill-suited to endure sustained economic recession and social
and political crises, particularly in a country where the democratization process is still
highly unstable. Thus, in an effort to extend Roberts’ party-society framework and
deepen our overall understanding of Latin American political party systems, it may be
useful to consider which linkages might best foster the connection between political
parties and society in countries like Bolivia.
Additionally, it seems important to begin to consider how the linkages between
political parties and society can be established initially and then sustained during periods
o f prolonged economic crisis and social change. Roberts gives no insight regarding how
a political party can adapt to shifting societal demands. The Bolivian case here
demonstrated that the traditional political parties were unable to adapt. By examining
cases of successful party adaptation to societal change, it is possible to envision how this
adaptation could take place in countries like Bolivia. Part o f the answer, as elaborated in
this study, may be to consider how the extant political system in a country impacts the
ability o f political parties to develop linkages with society. Pacted democracy, for
example, was positive in terms of enabling governance and stability in Bolivia. It also,
however, limited the role of the traditional political parties and prevented them from
establishing stronger linkages with society.
The case o f Bolivia underscores the vital importance o f deepening our
understanding o f party-society linkages in a country. Political party systems are, after all,
the fundamental actor in a representative democracy. The fact that they enter into decline
is undesirable, then, for the regime in general. Moreover, Bolivia is not the only country
in which party-society linkages may currently be very weak. The multiplication of
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political parties in Ecuador, along with the historically high levels o f electoral volatility
in the country, suggests that the problem of weak party-society linkages extends beyond
Bolivia into the rest of the Andes. Roberts has already addressed the case of party system
decay in Venezuela, and the decline of the Peruvian party system prior to Alberto
Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1993 is another example to investigate. On the other hand, the
stability o f Colombia’s two-party system is an apparent anomaly given the political
instability o f its neighbors. Indeed, the Andean region may serve as the ideal setting for
looking comparatively at the formation and erosion o f party-society linkages. Future
research should begin here.
For now, however, we can conclude that the traditional political party system in
Bolivia is at a crossroads. Far from realignment but still not in complete decay, the
coming years will be decisive ones for the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as well as the political
party system in general. Given Bolivia’s tumultuous political history and the recent
proliferation o f powerful political actors, the next years will no doubt be difficult ones as
well. Perhaps José Ortiz said it best in his citation o f an Italian thinker above: Bolivia is
indeed in a difficult transition.
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APPENDIX 1

Table 3.1

Source: Compiled by author using IMF 2000. 2003 and ECLAC 1999,
Annual economically active population is an estimate based on methods developed by CELADE
(see http://www.eclac.Org/publicaciones/Poblacion/9/LCG2059/BD64int00i.htm) .
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Table 3.3
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Table 3.4
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APPENDIX 2

Table 4.1
Vote Share of the Traditional Political Parties versus
Next Three Top Party Finishers

1989

1993

1997

I ■ Traditional □ Next Three j

2002
|

Source: Political Database o f the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002),
In each year above, Traditional refers to the three traditional political parties, that is, the MNR,
MIR, and ADN.
In 1989, Next Three refers to Condepa, IU, and PS-1, In 1993, Next Three refers to UCS,
Condepa, and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL). In 1997, Next Three refers to UCS, Condepa,
and MBL. In 2002, Next Three refers to the MAS, NFR, and MIP.
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Table 4 3
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APPENDIX 4

Table 4.4

N = 2904, base = 300
Source: CNE 2004,77; translations by author
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Table 4.5

N = 2904, base = 300
Source: CNE 2004, 79; translations by author
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Table 4.6

N - 2904
Source: CNE 2004, 80; translations by author
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